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Abstract 
 
Title:   
 
The Significance of the Implied Mutual Duty of Trust and Confidence in the 
Employment Relationship.  
 
Objectives: 
 
1. Trace the development of the implied duty in the both the Irish and 
English jurisdiction. 
 
2. Analyse the types of behaviour which will fall foul of the obligation to 
maintain trust and confidence.  
 
3. Ascertain the limits of the implied duty. 
 
4. Assess the current judicial climate following the first Supreme Court 
decision on the duty implied. 
 
5. Consider the implications of the implied duty on certain areas of 
employment law.  
 
6. Determine the potential for further development of the implied duty.  
 
Methods: 
 
Qualitative and Quantitative Research  
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Conclusions:     
 
1. The implied obligation is critically important in relation to the 
interaction between the common law and statute and underpins all 
employment relationships.  
 
2. The potential for damages via a claim of a breach of the implied duty 
has been and will continue to be restricted.   
 
3. The judicial climate is in favour of avoiding setting too high a standard 
for employers. 
 
4. A purely objective test fails to take account of the emotive nature of this 
area of law and contradicts the requirement to consider the parties’ 
conduct as a whole. 
 
5. The modern interpretation of the concept is that it is prescriptive and this 
narrowing has impacted on the requirements for interlocutory relief. 
 
6. The developing law on bonus payments is being shaped by reference to 
the implied duty of trust and confidence. 
 
7. The implied duty has the potential to determine the parameters of the 
law relating to workplace bullying.  
 
8. A breach of the implied duty can be waived but a finding of such should 
necessarily require an employer to establish that an employee did so 
with ‘actual knowledge’ of his legal rights.   
 
9. Existing inconsistencies in this area of law should be mitigated such that 
it will be possible to declare what the law relating to the implied duty is 
in forthright terms. 
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Chapter 1  
 
Introduction 
  
The age when management could ‘hire and fire’ at will is gone and it is now 
possible to assert that the employer has a legal duty to treat his employees with 
due respect and consideration, mindful of their needs and problems and 
sympathetic to their difficulties. It is no longer possible to treat an employee as 
an expendable chattel, or as an object without feelings and emotions. 
 
In Spring v Guardian Assurance1 Lord Slynn took cognisance of: 
 
“…the changes which have taken place in the employer/employee 
relationship, with far greater duties imposed on the employer than in the 
past, whether by statute or by judicial decision, to care for the physical, 
financial and even psychological welfare of the employee2”.   
 
The evolution of the duty of mutual trust and confidence is a prime example of 
this process. It has moved from a somewhat theoretical concept of contract law 
used mainly to limit an employee’s actions, to a dynamic overarching term of 
huge potential for an employee seeking to assert their position against the 
inevitably more powerful employer. 
 
Particularly strong recognition has been afforded to the role of the implied duty 
of mutual trust and confidence in the employment relationship in a number of 
contemporary High Court cases and most significantly the Supreme Court 
recently dealt with the issue in Berber v Dunnes Stores3 for the first time.   
 
                                                 
1 [1994] 3 All. E.R. 129  
2 Ibid at p.161  
3 Unreported, Supreme Court, 12th  February, 2009. 
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Employers must be aware of the significance of this implied duty as it is no 
longer enough for an employer to simply ensure compliance with the strict 
terms of the employment contract. They must also take account of the 
potentially broad reaching implications of the duty of trust and confidence that 
they owe to their employees.4 Traditional concepts such as the entitlement of 
an employer not to furnish work to an employee as long as they are paid are 
now undermined by radical new applications of this long-standing principle.5  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to consider in detail the development of this 
implied duty, in terms of how it has been expanded and restricted, the conduct 
of employers which has been found to breach the obligation, where the duty 
currently stands in this jurisdiction, the far-reaching impact this duty has had on 
various areas of employment law and its potential which, it is submitted, is yet 
to be fully realised. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Bolger, M. & Ryan, D., 2007. The mutual duty of fidelity in the contract of employment: Significant 
recent developments. (2007) 4(4) I.E.L.J. 112 
5 See Chapter 5.6 - Failing to Provide Work.   
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Chapter 2 
 
Implied Terms in the Contract of Employment  
 
2.1 Introduction
 
Implied terms allow the courts to achieve justice between the parties to 
an employment contract where the express terms of the contract and the 
existing statutory code are inadequate to the task.  
 
Terms may be implied by one of two mechanisms: 
 
1. the ‘officious bystander’ test; or 
2. by law. 
 
2.2 The ‘Officious Bystander’ Test  
 
The first situation where the courts will, independently of statutory 
requirement, imply a terms which has not been expressly agreed by the 
parties to a contract was identified in the well-known Moorcock case6 
where a term not expressly agreed upon by the parties was inferred on 
the basis of the presumed intention of the parties.  
 
The basis for such a presumption was explained by MacKinnon LJ in 
Shirlaw v Southern Foundries (1926) Ltd7 in the following terms: 
 
“Prima facie that which in any contract is left to be implied and 
need not be expressed is something so obvious that it goes 
                                                 
6 The Moorcock [1889] 14 P.D. 64 
7 [1939] 2 K.B. 206 
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without saying; so that, if while the parties were making their 
bargain, an officious bystander were to suggest some express 
provision for it in their agreement, they would testily suppress 
him with a common ‘Oh, of course’.”8
 
2.3 Terms Implied by Law  
 
Secondly, terms may be implied by law. There are a variety of cases in 
which a contractual term has been implied on the basis, not of the 
intention of the parties to the contract, but deriving from the nature of 
the contract itself. Indeed in analysing the different types of case in 
which a term will be implied Lord Wilberforce in Liverpool City 
Council v Irwin9 preferred to describe the different categories which he 
identified as no more than shades on a continuous spectrum.  
 
Such an implication will be justified by the category of contract and by 
necessity. For example, in Becton, Dickinson Ltd v Lee10, approved in 
Bates v Model Bakery11, the Supreme Court held that an implied term 
should be read into every contract of employment that service of a strike 
notice of a length not shorter than would be required for notice to 
terminate the contract, does not amount to notice to terminate the 
contract, save for those circumstances where there is an express 
provision to the contrary or where a contrary provision must, by 
necessary implication, be read into the contract.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 Ibid at p.227  
9 [1977] A.C. 239 
10 [1973] L.R. 1 
11 [1993] 1 I.R. 359 
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2.4 Conclusion    
 
Implied terms have mainly developed in the context of the employer’s 
right to dismiss an employee without notice and in the context of 
constructive dismissal. When determining the reasonableness of the 
employer’s actions for purposes of unfair dismissal the ruling authority 
(be it the Employment Appeals Tribunal or a Court) will be influenced 
by the express and implied contractual terms agreed by the parties. 
 
It is noteworthy that whichever test is used, a term will not be implied 
into a contract where inconsistent with the express wording of the 
contract or the surrounding circumstances or where it is unnecessary to 
the efficacy of the contract12. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12Sweeney v Duggan [1997] 2 I.L.R.M. 211; Ali v Christian Salvesan Ltd [1997] I.C.R. 25; Sullivan v 
Southern Health Board [1997] 3 L.R. 123 
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Chapter 3  
 
Implied Term of Mutual Trust and Confidence  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In the late 1970’s in the case of Courthaulds Northern Textiles Ltd v 
Andrew13 the implied duty was formulated as follows: 
 
“It was an implied term of the contract that the employers would 
not, without reasonable and proper cause, conduct themselves in 
a manner calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the 
confidence and trust between the parties.”14
 
The House of Lords in Mahmud & Malik v BCCI15 significantly rejected 
the antiquated notion of a ‘master and servant’ relationship and 
recognised the fundamental “change in legal culture which made 
possible the evolution of the implied term of trust and confidence”.16
 
3.2 The Leading Authority: Mahmud & Malik v BCCI
 
The leading authority on the implied term of mutual trust and confidence 
is the decision of the House of Lords in the aforementioned consolidated 
appeals of Mahmud & Malik v BCCI17. The House of Lords was asked 
to consider a case in which an employer was conducting a corrupt and 
fraudulent business. The plaintiffs had not been involved in the 
corruption, but nevertheless suffered financial losses and harm to their 
                                                 
13 [1979] I.R.L.R. 84  
14 Ibid per Arnold J. at p.86  
15 [1998] A.C. 20 
16 Ibid per Lord Steyn at p.46  
17 Supra, n.15  
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reputations and employment prospects when the employer’s fraudulent 
practices were eventually exposed. The existence of such an implied 
term of fidelity, trust and confidence was agreed between Counsel for 
the respective parties and arguments therefore were focused on the 
application of such a term and its precise scope.  
 
The plaintiffs were long-serving senior employees. Their employment 
was terminated by reason of redundancy when the bank went into 
liquidation following allegations of corruption and dishonesty by the 
bank. The plaintiffs claimed that they found it extremely difficult to 
obtain new employment because they were tainted by their association 
with the bank’s wrongdoing which was not due to their actions in any 
way. The plaintiffs sought and obtained damages for injury to reputation 
(‘stigma damages’) reflecting their loss of earnings arising from the 
damage to their reputations within the financial services sector.  
 
The House of Lords held that if the employer’s conduct was a breach of 
the duty to maintain trust and confidence which detrimentally affected 
an employee’s future employment prospects so as to give rise to 
continuing financial loss, and it was reasonably foreseeable that such 
loss was a serious possibility, damages would, in principle, be 
recoverable if injury to reputation (and hence future employment 
prospects) could be established as being a consequence of the breach. 
 
In considering the nature of the relationship created by the employment 
contract, Lord Nicholls and Lord Steyn (with whom Lords Goff, 
Mackay and Mustill agreed) held that, in agreeing to work for an 
employer, an employee cannot be taken to agree to work in furtherance 
of a dishonest business. Therefore, they must be entitled to leave that 
employment immediately when such dishonesty comes to light. In order 
to give effect to the right of the employee to leave without them 
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breaching the contract of employment, there must be a correlative 
obligation or term implied in the employment contract that the employer 
must not conduct a corrupt business. A breach of this term must 
accordingly be characterised as a repudiation of the employment 
contract that would entitle the employee to terminate the contract. 
 
Accordingly, the House of Lords considered that an implied term that 
the employer not conduct a corrupt or fraudulent business was necessary 
in order to facilitate the proper functioning of the employment contract 
and to allow the parties to enjoy the rights conferred by the contract of 
employment. More specifically, this term was necessary to ensure that 
the employee could enjoy the contractual benefit of employment by an 
honest employer.  
 
3.3 Conclusion
 
It is significant that for the purposes of assessing the plaintiff’s claims it 
was assumed that the business had been run in a dishonest or corrupt 
fashion, and the highly unusual nature of the case was captured in the 
following passage of the judgment of Lord Nicholls: 
 
“[O]ne of the assumed facts in the present case is that the 
employer was conducting a dishonest and corrupt business. I 
would like to think that this will rarely happen in practice.”18
 
 
 
                                                 
18 Supra, n.15 per Lord Nicholls at p.42 
 16
Notwithstanding the unusual facts, the scope of the duty was articulated 
in broad terms. In his judgment Lord Nicholls described the implied 
obligation as: 
 
“[n]o more than one particular aspect of the portmanteau, 
general obligation not to engage in conduct likely to undermine 
the trust and confidence required if the employment relationship 
is to continue in the manner the employment contract implicitly 
envisages.”19
 
The implied term of trust and confidence is the most central implied 
term of the contract of employment. The breadth of the definition has 
spawned much litigation in recent years and generated a great deal of 
academic attention, having been described as: assuming a central 
position in the law of the contract of employment20; being undoubtedly 
the most powerful engine of movement in the modern law of 
employment contracts21; and forming the cornerstone of the legal 
construction of the contract of employment22. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 Supra, n.15 per Lord Nicholls at p.34 
20 Brodie, D., 1996. The Heart of the Matter: Mutual Trust and Confidence. I.L.J. Vol. 25, No. 2  
21 Freedland, M.R., 2003. The Personal Employment Contract. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.  
22 Collins, H., 2003. Employment Law. Oxford Clarendon Law Series. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003.  
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Chapter 4 
 
The Significance of a Breach  
 
4.1 Introduction
 
Employees have sought to rely on the implied term of mutual trust and 
confidence in order to seek greater damages than those traditionally 
available for breach of contract.  
 
4.2 Damages are Irrecoverable for Manner of Dismissal  
 
In Addis v Gramophone Co Ltd23, the House of Lords held that an 
employee cannot recover damages for the manner in which a wrongful 
dismissal took place, for injured feelings or for any loss he or she may 
sustain from the fact that having been dismissed makes it more difficult 
for him to obtain new employment.  
 
In Kinlan v Ulster Bank24, citing Addis with approval, then Chief Justice 
Kennedy stated the proposition as follows: 
 
“It is very clearly settled, both in this country and in England, 
and affirmed in many cases that in actions for breach of contract 
damages may not be given for such matters as disappointment of 
mind, humiliation, vexation, or the like, nor may exemplary or 
vindicative damages be awarded.”25   
 
 
                                                 
23 [1909] A.C. 488 
24 [1928] I.R. 171  
25 Ibid at p.184  
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4.3 Distinguishing Addis from Malik  
 
In recent years, relying on the implied term of trust and confidence, 
plaintiffs have sought to escape the rule in Addis. They have been 
assisted in this by Malik in which, as set out above, the House of Lords 
held that there was an implied obligation on an employer that he would 
not carry on a dishonest or corrupt business and that if it was reasonably 
foreseeable that in consequences of such corruption there was a serious 
possibility that an employee’s future employment prospects would be 
handicapped, damages would be recoverable for any such continuing 
financial losses sustained.  
 
The case of Malik arose out of an application by the respondent to strike 
out the employee’s Statement of Claim that it was a viable claim that the 
respondent had breached this term due to the corrupt and dishonest way 
it had operated, which had left the appellants with a stigma attached to 
their reputations. As detailed above, they contended that it was thus 
more difficult to find employment, notwithstanding the fact that they 
were entirely innocent of wrongdoing. Accordingly, the appellants were 
held to be entitled on a strikeout application to proceed to claim 
damages for the financial loss suffered by them, although after a full 
trial they failed to prove their case. 
 
Addis could be distinguished from Malik, given that the loss in Malik 
was a financial loss arising from a breach of contract independently of 
and prior to the fact of dismissal. However, the Court went further than 
simply to distinguish Addis. Lord Nicholls stated that Addis did not 
preclude the recovery of damages where the manner of dismissal 
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involved a breach of the trust and confidence term and this caused 
financial loss.26  
 
Lord Steyn asserted that Addis did not decide that an employee may not 
recover financial loss for damage to his or her employment prospects 
caused by a breach of contract or that in breach of contract cases 
compensation for loss of reputation can never be awarded, or that it can 
only be awarded in cases falling in certain defined categories. Addis 
simply decided that the loss of reputation in that particular case could 
not be compensated because it was not caused by a breach of contract. 
 
4.4 Conclusion
 
This is a question that awaits resolution in Irish law. When the matter 
came before the High Court in Cronin v Eircom Ltd27 Laffoy J. did not 
consider it necessary to express any view on the status in this 
jurisdiction of the decision in the Addis case.  
 
Interestingly however, in Carey v Independent Newspapers (Ireland) 
Limited28 Gilligan J. commented that it was “of interest to note that 
other common law jurisdictions have rejected Addis”.29  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26 Supra, n.15 at p. 615  
27 [2007] E.L.R. 84 
28 [2004] 3 I.R. 52 
29 Ibid at p.82 citing the approach of the New Zealand High Court in Stuart v Armourguard Security 
[1996] 1 N.Z.L.R. 484 
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Chapter 5  
 
Manifestations of the Implied Term in Case Law  
 
5.1 Introduction
 
The implied term of trust and confidence has proved to be a powerful 
tool for employees seeking redress against their employers. Its 
manifestations are various.  
 
5.2 Unwarranted Suspension
 
In Gogay v Herts CC30 the issue was whether the defendant local 
authority acted reasonably in suspending the claimant from her post in a 
residential home while they investigated the circumstances surrounding 
a child living in that home. The investigation concluded that there was 
no case to answer, but the claimant suffered psychiatric illness and loss 
of earnings as a result of her suspension. 
 
Hale LJ stated that the implied term of confidence and trust requires an 
employer, in the words of Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead in Malik: 
  
“not to engage in conduct likely to undermine the trust and 
confidence required if the employment relationship is to continue 
in the manner the employment contract implicitly envisages…The 
conduct must, of course, impinge on the relationship in the sense 
that, looked at objectively, it is likely to destroy of seriously 
                                                 
30 [2000] I.R.L.R. 703 
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damage the degree of trust and confidence the employer is 
reasonable entitled to have in his employer”.31
 
Hale LJ further went on to point out that Lord Steyn emphasised that the 
obligation applies: 
 
“only where there is ‘no reasonable and proper cause’ for the 
employer’s conduct, and then only if the conduct is calculated to 
destroy or seriously damage the relationship…”32  
 
Hale LJ considered whether the authority’s conduct amounted to a 
breach of this implied term, opining that the test is a severe one. The 
conduct must be such as to destroy or seriously damage the relationship. 
This conduct in this case was not only to suspend the claimant, but to do 
so by means of a letter which stated that “the issue to be investigated is 
an allegation of sexual abuse made by a young person in our care”. 
Hale LJ stated that sexual abuse is a very serious matter, doing untold 
damage to those who suffer it and further to be accused of it is also a 
serious matter. To be told by one’s employer that one has been so 
accused is clearly calculated seriously to damage the relationship 
between employer and employee. The next question was therefore 
whether there was ‘reasonable and proper cause’ to do this.  
 
In Lord Justice Hale’s judgment there clearly was not. The information 
considered by the investigator of the allegations and the strategy 
meeting convened by him to consider and plan that investigation was 
“difficult to evaluate”. The difficulty was in determining what, if 
anything, the child in care who had both learning and communication 
difficulties and who had been sexually abused by her father, was trying 
                                                 
31 Supra, n.15 at p.35A & C  
32 Supra, n.30 at p.53B  
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to convey. It was agreed that it warranted further investigation but to 
describe it as an “allegation of sexual abuse” was putting it far too high. 
A close reading of the records, coupled with further inquiries of the 
child’s therapist, was needed before it could be characterised as such.  
There was therefore a breach of the term and the employee was entitled 
to something better than the ‘knee-jerk’ reaction of suspension.  
 
5.2.1 Distinguishing Types of Suspension: Punitive & Holding  
 
It is noteworthy that if the Gogay line of reasoning is to accepted in this 
jurisdiction, of significance would be the fact that the Irish courts have 
drawn a distinction between two types of suspension: punitive and 
holding and existing case law to this effect may exert a salient influence 
on whether the Irish courts would, in the context of a suspension, find 
the mutual duty to have been engaged.33  
 
The distinction between the two types of suspension was explained by 
Barr J. in Quirke v Bord Luthchleas na hEireann34 as follows: 
 
“[S]uspension…may take two different forms. On the one hand, it 
may be imposed as a holding operation pending the investigation 
of a complaint. Such a suspension does not imply that there has 
been a finding of any misbehaviour or breach of rules by the 
suspended person, but merely that an allegation of some such 
impropriety or misconduct has been made against the member in 
question. On the other hand, the suspension may be imposed not 
as a holding operation pending the outcome of an inquiry, but as 
a penalty by way on punishment of a member who has been found 
guilty of misconduct or breach of rules. The importance of the 
                                                 
33 See supra, n.4 
34 [1988] I.R. 83 
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distinction is that where a suspension is imposed by way of 
punishment, it follows that the body in question has found it’s 
guilty of significant misconduct or breach of rules.”35  
 
The importance of this distinction was illustrated in the High Court 
judgment of Morgan v Trinity College36. The plaintiff was employed as 
a senior lecturer in the Department of English in Trinity College Dublin. 
He was suspended with pay with immediate effect on foot of a 
complaint made by a female colleague who alleged physical 
intimidation and harassment. The plaintiff applied, inter alia, for an 
interlocutory injunction restraining the Defendants from removing him 
from office and restraining them from embarking on a disciplinary 
inquiry. He contended, inter alia, that there was a failure to comply with 
natural justice in that he did not have an opportunity to challenge his 
accusers during the investigation, and that his suspension was invalid as 
it constituted a second suspension and should in any event be lifted by 
reason of its duration.  
 
Kearns J. refused the relief sought and held that whether a suspension 
amounted to a sanction such as would invoke concepts of natural justice 
or give rise to an inference that the person concerned had been found 
guilty of significant misconduct was, in every case, a question of fact 
and degree. Kearns J. emphasised the importance of the distinction 
between a holding suspension and a punitive suspension, citing the 
above passage from the judgment of Barr J. in Quirke. Kearns J. stressed 
that in the context of a punitive suspension, the person affected was 
entitled to be afforded natural justice and fair procedures before the 
decision to suspend was taken; by contrast, in the latter case, the rules of 
natural justice might not apply.  
                                                 
35 Ibid at p.87  
36 [2003] 3 I.R. 157 
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It should be noted however that while the period of the suspension must 
be sufficiently reasonable to allow the investigation to take place (as 
pointed out by Kearns J. in Quirke) a suspension will not be allowed to 
continue for an “inordinate and unjust” amount time. This was held to 
be so in Martin v Nationwide Building Society37 wherein Macken J. in 
the High Court granted an injunction allowing the Plaintiff to return to 
work even though he had been suspended to allow an investigation into 
allegations of misconduct. In order to avoid activating the implied duty 
in such a circumstance, employers should ensure that investigations are 
carried out in a prompt and efficient manner.   
 
5.3 An Invitation to Resign 
 
There was also found to be a breach in Billington v Michael Hunter & 
Sons Ltd38, which proceeded as an appeal against a Decision of the 
Employment Tribunal wherein, by a majority, the Employment Tribunal 
held that there had not been a fundamental breach of contract so that her 
resignation could not be construed as a dismissal. The Appellant’s case 
was that she had been constructively dismissed by the Respondent 
employer when she was told that she was likely to face dismissal on the 
outcome of a disciplinary investigation, but may instead resign on a 
generous resignation package. 
 
The Employment Appeal Tribunal again observed that a proper 
consideration of this implied term may involve two separate issues. 
Firstly there may be the question whether an employer has conducted 
itself in a manner calculated and likely to destroy or seriously damage 
the relationship of confidence and trust between the parties. If the 
answer to that question is no, that is the end of the case; but if the 
                                                 
37 [2001] 1 I.R. 228 
38 [2003] UKEAT 0578 03 1610, 16th October, 2003.    
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answer is yes, a second issue arises, namely whether the employer has 
done so without reasonable and proper cause.  
 
As to the first question, in the judgment of the Employment Appeal 
Tribunal the Employment Tribunal’s findings were only consistent with 
a conclusion that the Respondent did conduct itself in a manner 
calculated and likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of 
confidence and trust between the parties. Firstly, it was noted that there 
was an express finding that at a final meeting, which was said by the 
employer not to be a continuation of the disciplinary meeting held some 
days earlier but did have connection with it and its intention was to 
examine and discuss the Appellant’s performance and whether she felt 
able to continue this the job, the Respondent invited the Appellant to 
resign and offered her favourable terms if she could choose to do so.  
 
Secondly, it was noted that the Employment Tribunal’s conclusion that 
the Respondent was indicating on that day that it regarded itself as better 
off without her and that any reasonable employee on that date could 
have regarded the invitation to resign as being a vote of no confidence in 
her. Thirdly it was noted that the Employment Tribunal found the 
minute that that meeting to be accurate or at any rate not fundamentally 
to misrepresent what was said at the meeting. 
 
On this third finding, the Employment Appeal Tribunal found that if it 
was so, then the minute itself betrayed a remarkable state of affairs. The 
Appellant was told that the meeting was not a continuation of the 
disciplinary meeting, but a number of further allegations were put to her 
and in the result it was made clear to her that if there were any further 
instances such as those that had already been detailed and those 
mentioned at this meeting, she would very likely be dismissed. The 
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earlier meeting had ended in a written warning. This in substance was a 
final warning.  
 
That, coupled with the invitation to resign, the ‘vote of no confidence’ 
which the Employment Tribunal had found, and other things that were 
said in the minute of that meeting as well about “sullen behaviour” and 
the like, lead the Employment Appeal Tribunal to the conclusion that the 
Respondent certainly behaved in a manner calculated and likely to 
destroy or seriously damage its relationship with the Appellant.  
 
The Employment Appeal Tribunal considered with the vote of no 
confidence was justified by repeated complaints and therefore the 
“without reasonable and proper cause” element of the implied term was 
unsatisfied but found that the reference to repeated complaints to be 
insufficient to meet the requirement of reasonable and proper cause 
without any further finding or investigation.  
 
5.4 Failing to Alert to a Vacancy 
 
Perhaps one of the most interesting manifestations of this principle is to 
be found in the case of Visa International Service Association v Paul39, 
the English Employment Appeals Tribunal held that the employers had 
fundamentally breached the implied term of mutual trust and confidence 
entitling the claimant to claim constructive dismissal, by failing to notify 
her, while she was on maternity leave, of a vacancy for which she would 
have applied if she had been aware of it, notwithstanding that she could 
not have been short-listed for the post. In reference to the argument that 
no fundamental breach of contract by the respondent was made out in 
                                                 
39 [2004] I.R.L.R. 42 
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circumstances where the Tribunal found as a fact that the applicant was 
not ‘shortlistable’ for the post, Judge Peter Clarke stated,  
 
“That, in our view, misses the point. Her complaint was not that 
she had not been informed of a job opportunity which turned out 
to be illusory. It was that she believed that she was suitable for 
the post ad the Respondent’s failure to notify her of that 
opportunity fatally undermined her trust and confidence in the 
Respondent after twelve years service. That case, upheld by the 
Tribunal, was not dependent on her losing the chance, in fact, of 
successfully applying for the post. The Tribunal’s conclusion is, 
in our judgment, consistent with the formulation of the implied 
term to be found in the judgment of Brown-Wilkinson P in Woods 
v WM Car Services [1981] ICR 666 (EAT) at 670; and by the 
House of Lords in Mahmud v BCCI [1997] IRLR 462…” 
 
5.5 Foul & Abusive Language
 
Again, in Horkulak v Cantor Fitzgerald International40, the English 
High Court held that the conduct of the defendant company’s chief 
executive in asserting his authority over the claimant senior managing 
director by the use of foul and abusive language which gave the 
claimant no chance to respond to any criticism, and insisting on 
standards of achievement which he had no grounds for believing the 
claimant could attain amounted to a breach of the implied term of trust 
and confidence. Newman J stated that: 
 
“The law has developed so as to recognise an employment 
contract as engaging obligations in connection with the self 
                                                 
40 [2003] I.R.L.R. 756 
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esteem and dignity of the employee. There is an obvious tension 
between the circumstances which have been address in this 
development of the law and the currency of the language in 
evidence in this case.”41  
 
Newman J referred to the following passage from the speech of Lord 
Steyn in Malik: 
 
 “…The major importance of the implied duty of trust and 
confidence lies in its impact on the obligations of the 
employer…And the implied obligation as formulated is apt to 
cover the great diversity of situations in which a balance has to be 
struck between an employer’s interest in managing his business as 
he sees fit and the employee’s interest in not being unfairly and 
improperly exploited. 
 
 The evolution of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence 
is a fact…It has proved workable in practice. It has not been the 
subject of an adverse criticism in any decided cases and it has 
been welcomed in academic writings. I regard the emergence of 
the implied obligation of trust and confidence as a sound 
development.”42  
 
5.6 Failing to Provide Work
 
In Ireland, the scope of the mutual duty of fidelity, trust and confidence 
was greatly expanded by the judgment of Laffoy J. in Cronin v Eircom 
Limited43 mentioned above. In this case, the plaintiff had been employed 
                                                 
41 Ibid at para.17  
42 Supra, n.15 at p.45H-46D  
43 Supra, n.27  
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by the defendant since 1999. She was paid a salary and earned a bonus. 
On the 10th of April 2000 the plaintiff was seconded to Eircom UK Ltd, 
a subsidiary of Eircom Plc, on terms that she was to remain an employee 
of Eircom Plc, that her conditions of employment, except as varied by 
terms of a letter dated 6th April 2000, and any other contractual 
entitlements, were to remain unchanged and that at the end of 
secondment she would continue in employment with Eircom Ireland in 
accordance with existing terms and conditions of employment.  
 
Later in the year 2000, and whilst on secondment, the Plaintiff was 
promoted to the position of Accounts Manager for Irish Accounts. Her 
salary increased and the introduction of a commission scheme was 
promised. However, all other terms, conditions and benefits were to 
remain unchanged. On the 26th of April 2001 the Plaintiff was informed 
that due to dramatic restructuring within the company, the business 
could no longer sustain her secondment as Account Manager for Irish 
Accounts and that she was to be repatriated to Eircom Plc with effect 
from the 31st of May 2001.  
 
From that time until February 2005 when she was offered a position of 
Product Support Executive, the plaintiff had been deprived of an 
appropriate job by the defendant. The essence of the case was there was 
implied into the contract of employment a term of mutual trust and 
confidence which required the employer to provide the plaintiff with 
work which matched her skills and the achievements she had 
accomplished. In failing to provide such work, the defendant had 
thereby deprived her of opportunities which would have been available 
to her to be promoted and to advance her career. As a consequence, it 
was submitted, the plaintiff’s career prospects had been damaged both 
within the defendant and generally.  
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Laffoy J. found in favour of the plaintiff. In a radical departure from the 
traditional view that an employer was only obliged to pay remuneration 
rather than to provide work, Laffoy J. accepted that the plaintiff had a 
contractual right to be provided with work “so that she would have an 
opportunity to gain experience, pursue promotion in her job and 
advance her career”.44  
 
On the facts, Laffoy J. did not consider it was an appropriate case to 
award stigma damages and referred to the decision in Malik as “not 
really apposite” in that the plaintiff in Cronin was still an employee of 
the defendant and had not been put in the position of seeking alternative 
employment. 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
 
As can be seen from the above, the implied duty is implicit in cases 
involving dismissal or disciplinary procedures and is particularly evident 
where the employer is alleged to have been carrying out provocative 
conduct.  
  
The cases considered above demonstrate how the duty as formulated is 
apt to cover the diversity of situations in which a balance has to be 
struck between an employer’s interest in managing his business as he 
sees fit and the employee’s interest in not being unfairly and improperly 
exploited.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
44 Supra, n.27 at p.104 
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Chapter 6 
 
Limits to the Implied Duty    
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
As noted in by Gilligan J. in Carey45 the case of Malik was authority for 
a limited right of recovery where an employee’s future job prospects 
have been damaged by the employer. It is now proposed to consider how 
the common law relating to the implied obligation has been shaped by 
the gradual setting of boundaries on the recoverability of damages where 
trust and confidence is at issue.  
 
6.2 Restrictions on the Right to Recovery  
 
The status of Malik was the subject of argument in the High Court case 
of McGrath v Trintech Technologies Ltd and Trintech Group Plc46 
wherein Laffoy J. rejected the proposition that the mutual duty of trust 
and confidence could imply into the contractual relationship a term that 
the plaintiff would not be dismissed without due cause or without 
reasonable notice or consultation and that the defendant would adopt fair 
procedures in any review or selection process for dismissal or 
redundancy in a manner that would suggest a consistency with the 
approach of the House of Lords in Johnson v Unisys47 which case shall 
also be considered herein.  
 
 
                                                 
45 Supra, n.28 
46 [2005] 4 I.R. 382 
47 [2001] I.R.L.R. 279 
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In support of their submission that it is settled law that the employment 
relationship is governed by an implied term of mutual trust and 
confidence, Counsel on behalf of Mr. McGrath referred to Redmond’s 
“Dismissal Law in Ireland”48 at paragraph 2.11 wherein the evolution of 
the implied terms of mutual trust and confidence in a contract of 
employment is analysed. It is stated that the modern approach is 
prescriptive: the mutual duty of trust and confidence obliges the parties 
in the contract of employment to behave towards one another in a way 
which respects trust and confidence and enables it to flourish between 
them. On the employer’s side, it is suggested his prescriptive duty not to 
do anything to destroy the relationship of confidence translates, inter 
alia, into a duty to provide fair procedures in disciplinary matters, a 
prescriptive duty already endorsed in this jurisdiction in the 
Constitution.  
 
Laffoy J. narrowed the question arising in that matter as to whether that 
broad principle can accommodate the implication in the contractual 
relationship of the plaintiff and the defendant of terms that the plaintiff 
would not be dismissed without due cause or without reasonable notice 
or consultation and that the defendant would adopt fair procedures in 
any review or selection process for dismissal or redundancy, the breach 
of which would give rise to an action at common law.  
 
In contending that it cannot do so in a manner as to give rise to an 
inconsistency or conflict with another contractual term governing the 
relationship of the parties, the defendant referred to the speech of Lord 
Hoffman in Johnson49. In his speech, having acknowledged that the 
contribution of the common law to the employment revolution has been 
by the evolution of implied terms in the contract of employment, the 
                                                 
48  Redmond M., 2007. Dismissal Law in Ireland, 2nd Edition. Haywards Heath: Tottel Publishing, 
2007.  
49 Supra, n.47  
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most far-reaching being the implied term of trust and confidence, Lord 
Hoffman went on to say: 
 
“The problem lies in extending or adapting any of these implied 
terms to dismissal. There are two reasons why dismissal presents 
special problems. The first is that any terms which the courts 
imply into a contract must be consistent with the express terms of 
the contract but cannot contradict them. Only Parliament may 
actually override what the parties have agreed…”50
 
On the facts of the Johnson case, Lord Hoffman stated that, in the face 
of the express provision in Mr. Johnson’s contract that Unisys was 
entitled to terminate his employment at four weeks’ notice without any 
reason, it was very difficult to imply a term that Unisys should not do so 
except for some good cause and after giving reasonable opportunity to 
demonstrate that no such cause existed. 
 
Lord Steyn who dissented on the issue as to whether Mr. Johnson had a 
reasonable cause of action based on breach of the implied obligation of 
trust and confidence, took a different view. Commenting on the 
argument by Counsel for Unisys that to apply the implied obligation of 
mutual trust and confidence in relation to a dismissal was to bring it into 
conflict with the express terms of the contract, he said: 
 
“Nevertheless, relying on the notice provision, Counsel for the 
employers submitted that to apply the implied obligation of 
mutual trust and confidence in relation to a dismissal is to bring 
it into conflict with the express terms of the contract. He said 
orthodox contract law does not permit such a result. His 
                                                 
50 Supra, n.47 at p.816  
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argument approached the matter as if one was dealing with the 
question of whether a term can be implied in fact in the light of 
the express terms for the contract. This submission loses sight of 
the particular nature of the implied obligation of mutual trust and 
confidence. It is not a term implied in fact. It is an overarching 
obligation implied by law as an incident of the contract of 
employment. It can also be described as a legal duty imposed by 
law: Treitel, The Law of Contract, p 190. It requires at least 
express words of a necessary implication to displace it or to cut 
down its scope. Prima facie it must be read consistently with the 
express terms of the contract. This emerges from the seminal 
judgment of Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V-C in Imperial 
Group Pension Trust Ltd v Imperial Tobacco Ltd [1991] 1 WLR 
589. It related to an employer’s express contractual right to 
refuse amendments under a pension scheme. The Vice-
Chancellor held that the employer’s express rights were subject 
to the implied obligation that they should not be exercised so as 
to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of trust and 
confidence between the company and its employees and former 
employees. The employer’s blanket refusal was unlawful. The 
decision did not involve trust law and the employer was not 
treated as a fiduciary. It was decided on principles of contract 
law. Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V-C described the implied 
obligation of trust and confidence as “the implied obligation of 
good faith”. It could also be described as an employer’s 
obligation of fair dealing. In the same way an employer’s express 
right to transfer an employee may be qualified b the obligation of 
mutual trust and confidence: see United Bank Ltd v Akhtar 
[1989] IRLR 507, Sweet & Maxwell’s Encyclopaedia of 
Employment Law, vol 1, paras 1.5101 and 1.5107. The 
interaction of the implied obligation of trust and confidence and 
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express terms of the contract can be compared with the 
relationship between duties of good faith or fair dealings with the 
express terms of notice in a contract. They can live together. 
 
Lord Steyn went on to say, however, that: 
 
“The notice provision in the contract is valid and effective. 
Nobody suggests the contrary. On the other hand, the employer 
may become liable in damages if he acts in breach of the 
independent implied obligation by dismissing the employee in a 
harsh and humiliating manner. There is no conflict between the 
express and implied terms. I would therefore dismiss this 
argument.” 
 
Laffoy J. found however that the essence of Mr. McGrath’s case was 
that there should be implied into his contract with the defendant a term 
that mere compliance with the express notice provision in the contract 
would not validly and effectively terminate the contractual relationship 
at common law. The learned judge went on to say that there was no 
authority for such a proposition and that she was persuaded by the 
authorities cited by the defendant’s Counsel that the proposition is not 
sound in principle.  
 
Accordingly, Laffoy J. came to the conclusion that terms in relation to 
dismissal and redundancy on the lines pleaded by the plaintiff could not 
be implied into the plaintiff’s contract of employment with the 
defendant so as to give rise to a cause of action at common law and in 
circumstances where such protection and remedies as are afforded by 
statute to the plaintiff regarding incidents which prevailed cannot be 
pursued at first instance in a plenary action in the High Court.  
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6.3 Conclusion
 
This proposition was been further supported in the later High Court 
judgment of Pickering v Microsoft Ireland Operations Limited51 
wherein Esmond Smyth J. referred to the approach of Laffoy J. in 
McGrath and concluded as follows: 
 
“I am satisfied that the position at common law continues to be 
that an employer is entitled to dismiss an employee for any 
reason or no reason, on giving reasonable notice, and that 
damages for the manner of a dismissal are confined to those 
damages to which an employee would be entitled for the notice 
period and do not include damages for the manner of dismissal. 
Furthermore, not can an implied term, such as for example, an 
implied term of mutual trust and confidence, be relied on to 
circumvent that principle.”52  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
51 [2006] E.L.R. 65 
52 Ibid at p.114  
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Chapter 7  
 
Psychiatric Injury Arising out of Employer’s Breach of Trust  
  
7.1 The English Approach  
 
Attempts by plaintiffs in the UK to rely upon Malik in an attack upon 
Addis have failed because of the existence of the statutory remedy for 
unfair dismissal. 
 
In Johnson (followed in Eastwood v Magnox Electric plc53), the plaintiff 
was summarily dismissed and was awarded damages for unfair dismissal 
by an industrial tribunal. He then instituted fresh proceedings and was 
awarded damages for unfair dismissal by an industrial tribunal. He then 
instituted fresh proceedings seeking damages for psychiatric injury 
suffered arising out of his employer’s breach of the implied term of trust 
and confidence in the manner in which he was dismissed. The House of 
Lords dismissed his claim. The majority of the House of Lords held that 
the contractual duty of trust and confidence did not apply to dismissal or 
the manner in which employment was terminated. It declined to extend 
the scope of the implied term of trust and confidence to the context of a 
dismissal. It held that to do so would be inappropriate, given the 
statutory remedy for unfair dismissal.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
53 [2002] I.R.L.R. 447 
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Their Lordships also reasoned that the implied term of trust and 
confidence is concerned with preserving the continuing relationship of 
employment and not linked to its termination. Consequentially, Lord 
Hoffman opined: 
 
“So it does not seem altogether appropriate for use in connection 
with the way that relationship is terminated. If one is looking for 
an implied term, I think a more elegant solution is…[the] 
implication of a separate term that the power of dismissal will be 
exercised fairly and in good faith. But the result would be the 
same as that for which Mr. Johnson contends by invoking the 
implied term of trust and confidence. As I have said, I think it 
would be possible to reach such a conclusion without 
contradicting the express term that the employer is entitled to 
dismiss without cause.”  
 
While Johnson therefore limits the scope of the implied term of trust and 
confidence, the case of McCabe v Cornwall County Council54 is 
authority for the fact that Johnson does not preclude an employee from 
seeking damages for psychiatric injury in respect of disciplinary 
proceedings arising independently of dismissal.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
54 [2003] I.R.L.R. 87 
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7.2 The Irish Approach  
 
The Irish High Court showed a similar disposition to that taken by the 
House of Lords in Johnson. Mr. Justice Smyth in Harrington v Irish Life 
and Permanent plc55 dismissed the plaintiff’s claim in respect of 
personal injuries arising out of a breach of his contract of employment in 
a few words: 
 
“[The argument that] the Plaintiff was entitled to damages for 
personal injuries was also advanced, but I am satisfied, on the 
authority of the Bliss case, in which the Court held that the 
defendant  employer had fundamentally breached the contract of 
employment by requiring the plaintiff to provide a psychiatric 
report as a condition of return to work, that the general rule laid 
down by the House of Lords in Addis v Gramophone Company 
Limited [1909] A.C. 488 is that where damages fall to be 
assessed for breach of contract rather than tort it is not 
permissible to award general damages for frustration, mental 
distress, injured feelings or annoyance caused by the breach’ is 
the applicable law in this jurisdiction’ ”.  
 
Mr. Justice Smyth did not allude to Johnson and neither Bliss nor Addis 
provide authority for the proposition that a plaintiff may not obtain 
damages for personal injuries arising out of a breach of contract.56  
 
 
 
                                                 
55 Unreported, High Court, Smyth J., 18th June, 2003. 
56 Maguire, C., 2004. Implied Terms and Conditions and the Contract of Employment (2004) 1(5) 
I.E.L.J. 146 
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Interestingly, in Quigley v Complex Tooling and Moulding57 the 
Plaintiff appeared to be seeking damages for stress and distress suffered 
by him during a lead up to a termination of his employment. Lavan J. 
expressly distinguished what had been held in McGrath and found that 
Mr. Quigley was seeking to establish that the conduct of the employer 
during the employment was such as to amount to a breach of an implied 
duty to maintain trust and confidence during the employment 
relationship, and caused him injury. The court accepted that this claim 
was separate and distinct from the claim for unfair dismissal.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
57 [2005] 16 E.L.R. 305 
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Chapter 8 
 
Assessing whether a Breach Occurred    
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
An important consideration in regard to the nature of the duty concerns 
whether an objective or subjective standard is to be applied to the 
assessment of its alleged breach. Crucially, in Malik the Law Lords 
rejected the submission advanced on behalf of the bank that, as the 
employees were unaware of the bank’s wrongdoing during their 
employment, their confidence in their employer could not have been 
undermined. This argument was predicated upon the acceptance of a 
subjective standard which the Law Lords held was inappropriate.58
 
As Lord Nicholls observed: 
 
“[T]he objective standard provides the answer to the 
[Respondent’s] submission that unless the employee’s confidence 
is actually undermined there is no breach. A breach occurs where 
the proscribed conduct takes place; here, by operating a 
dishonest and corrupt business. Proof of a subjective loss of 
confidence is not an essential element of the breach.” 
 
It is the effect of the impugned conduct, as distinct from the motivation 
behind that conduct, which is relevant for the purposes of assessing 
whether the duty of trust and confidence has been breached.  
 
 
                                                 
58 Supra, n.4  
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8.2 Case Study - The First Decision of the Supreme Court on the Implied 
Duty: Berber v Dunnes Stores  
 
8.2.1 Introduction 
 
That same objective standard has recently been expressly endorsed as 
forming part of Irish law by the Supreme Court on an employer’s 
successful appeal in Berber v Dunnes Stores Limited59. Laffoy J. had 
found in the employee’s favour in the High Court and her contrary 
findings shall be considered also. As aforesaid this is the first judgment 
of the Supreme Court on the implied duty and it is therefore worthy of 
detailed consideration.  
 
The respondent advanced a number of causes of action in his pleadings 
and while two issues arose for the purposes of the Appeal, the following 
question considered by the Supreme Court is for present purposes, that 
of interest is whether the respondent was wrongfully dismissed by 
reason of a breach by the appellant of the implied term of the contract of 
employment that it would not conduct itself in a manner likely to 
destroy or seriously damage the relationship of confidence and trust 
between the employer and employee, such breach amounting to 
repudiation of the contract of employment which the Respondent was 
entitled to accept.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
59 Supra, n.3  
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 8.2.2 The Facts 
 
 In examining the Supreme Court’s approach to the implied term of trust 
and confidence, it is essential to set out the factual background of this 
case. The respondent commenced employment with the appellant as a 
Trainee Manager in April 1980 at the age of 19. On completion of his 
training he was employed as Store Manager at various locations until 
1988. From 1988 until November 2000 he transferred from store 
management to the position of Buyer being successively Group 
Footwear Merchandiser, Men’s Footwear Buyer and Men’s Readymade 
Buyer. On his last management performance review in February 2000 
his performance was generally rated at the level of “effective 
contribution”. The assessment provided for four performance standards 
in descending order – excellent, effective contribution and below 
standard. The review contained a comment “colour issue”. Some years 
prior to that review the appellant had a colour blindness test carried out 
on all buyers and the respondent was reported as colour blind. 
Notwithstanding this he had been moved to a position as Men’s 
Readymade Buyer. From February 2000 onwards the plaintiff’s 
evidence was there was a change of attitude towards him evinced by the 
following: - 
 
(a) Unlike previous years as a buyer when he spend as many 
as 50 days abroad during 2000 he was sent abroad only 
once; and 
 
(b) There was an increased interest in the state of his health 
notwithstanding an excellent work attendance record. He 
had been diagnosed with Crohn’s disease in 1978. He had 
a recurrence of his disease in 1995 and again in Spring 
2000. In the years 1995, 1996 and 1999 he missed one day 
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through illness. He had no absences in 1998. He was 
absent for five days in 1997 and five days in 1997 and 
seven days in 2000 up to the 23rd of November 2000.60 
 
 
In July 2000 he was told that he was not being sent on a trip to the Far 
East because Mrs. Heffernan was concerned that he might get ill on 
account of his Crohn’s disease and he considered this “bizarre”. In 
October 2000 the respondent was informed that he was to be transferred 
from buying back to store management and his colour blindness was 
averted to at this time. He was informed on the 22nd of November 2000 
that he was to be moved to the appellant’s store in the ILAC Centre 
Dublin as either Department Manager of Menswear or Ladieswear. The 
respondent considered this demotion and sought a meeting with Mrs. 
Heffernan and a meeting took place on the 23rd of November 2000. At 
the meeting it was agreed that the respondent would return to store 
management initially at the Appellant’s store in Blanchardstown 
Shopping Centre, which was regarded as the flagship store, where he 
would undergo training with a view to being fast-tracked for 
appointment as Store Manager or Regional Manager within 6 – 12 
months.  
 
The respondent’s understanding was that he would commence work in 
the  Ladieswear Department in Blanchardstown on Blanchardstown 
on the 4th of December 2000. On the 27th of November 2000 the 
respondent was directed to report for duty that day to Blanchardstown 
and take up a position in the Homewares Department. He considered 
this a variation of his agreement with Mrs. Heffernan and he tried to 
contact her without success as she was abroad. He did not go to 
                                                 
60 The relevance of this date will appear hereafter.  
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Blanchardstown on the 27th of November 2000 but was contacted the 
next day by the Director of Store Operations Mr. McNiffe.  
 
On the 28th & 29th of November 2000 the Respondent had three 
meetings with Mr. McNiffe. At the meeting on the 28th of November 
2000 the respondent refused to go to Blanchardstown until such time as 
he had spoken with Mrs. Heffernan. There were two meetings on the 
29th of November 2000. At the first meeting the respondent read out a 
statement which he had prepared but refused to furnish a copy to Mr. 
McNiffe and maintained his refusal to go to Blanchardstown. At the 
second meeting the Respondent maintained this position and Mr. 
McNiffe suspended him from work with pay. Thereafter the 
respondent’s communications to the appellant were largely through his 
solicitors.  
 
The first solicitors’ letter dated 7th December 2000 made it clear that the 
Respondent would go to Blanchardstown on the terms which he had 
agreed with Mrs. Heffernan. The matters raised on his behalf were that 
the transfer was taking place seven days earlier than agreed, a plan to 
fastrack him was not yet prepared and that the position was in 
Homewares. In the letter the Respondent’s solicitors said in relation to 
the Respondent’s suspension: - 
 
“The effect of this quite extraordinary conduct on the part of the 
company towards our client and the stress generated by it, has 
resulted in our client becoming ill and he attended his doctor on 
1 December and again today, 7 December, who has ordered him 
to rest and certificates to this effect have been delivered to the 
company.” 
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The letter threatened proceedings if the suspension was not lifted. In a 
short report of the 31st of January 2001 the Respondent’s treating 
surgeon had this to say: -  
 
“Over the last while he has had an exacerbation of symptoms (of 
Chron’s disease) and I have no doubt the recent wrangle has 
exacerbated his symptoms and has resulted in him having to 
increase his medication.”  
 
In a reply of the 12th of December 2000 the Appellant’s solicitors gave 
as the reason for the respondent’s suspension his attitude at the meetings 
with Mr. McNiffe, his persistence in seeking to speak to Mrs. Heffernan 
and his refusal to explain his issues to Mr. McNiffe which they 
categorised as unreasonable. The letter indicated that the Appellant was 
prepared to overlook the incident provided that the respondent reported 
to work in Blanchardstown as son as certified fit to do so by his doctor. 
 
Having considered this evidence Laffoy J. in the High Court categorised 
the attitude of each of the parties. The respondent considered that Mrs. 
Heffernan was intent on ousting him from his employment. He 
attributed this to jealousy of the respondent’s brother who had achieved 
remarkable commercial success. Mrs. Heffernan had alluded to this at 
the meeting on the 23rd of November 2000. The learned trial judge found 
that the appellant was motivated by sound management considerations 
in deciding to transfer the respondent from buying to store management. 
However the respondent’s solicitors’ letter of the 7th of December 2000 
should have sounded alarm bells with the respondent’s senior 
management as to the respondent’s state of health. 
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On the other hand the appellant inferred from the respondent’s conduct 
that he had an ulterior motive in that he was attempting to orchestrate a 
situation in which he could get a severance payment or compensation: 
the learned trial judged held that this an incorrect inference. Laffoy J. 
concluded that while some of the respondent’s behaviour might be 
characterised as unreasonable, it was attributable to his trust in the 
appellant’s senior management executives having been shattered. The 
learned trial judge noted that responses from Mr. McNiffe to the 
respondent solicitor’s letters were sent directly to the Respondent at his 
home address sometimes by courier and sometimes on Saturday, and, 
while the appellant was entitled to communicate directly with the 
respondent, this course heightened the respondent’s distrust of the 
appellant and increased the stress he was under. 
 
The respondent reported for work in Blanchardstown on the 28th of 
December 2000 having been cleared to do so by his doctor. There was 
an incident that day. He was dressed casually in the manner in which he 
dressed while working as a buyer in Head Office. He was informed by 
Mr. Sills, the Store Manager, that the dress code for managers was a 
conservative coloured suit and formal footwear. The respondent asked 
Mr. Sills to put that in writing and Mr. Sills did so on the 29th of 
December 2000.  
 
The respondent explained that he was on the defensive at this time 
because of the cumulative effect of the problems which he was having. 
He ceased work again for four days on account of his ill health. He 
contended that his treatment at Blanchardstown in this period 
exacerbated his ill health. He particularised two matters: -  
 
(a) A document entitled “Drapery Management Analysis” widely 
circulated included his name under the heading of “New 
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Trainees” which he considered humiliating, defamatory and 
vindictive. The document is a manuscript duty roster for the 
particular store for a particular week; and 
 
(b) A personalised 12-week Homewares training plan which was 
furnished to him on his arrival was appropriate to a newly joined 
trainee and failed to take account of his 21 years experience.  
 
These complaints were contained in a letter of the 11th of January 2000 
from the respondent’s solicitors in which it was alleged that these 
matters were a continuation of a course of treatment which began the 
preceding February designed to sideline him out of management and out 
of his employment. The letter demanded the withdrawal of the Drapery 
Management Analysis and the preparation of an appropriately devised 
training plan. There was a measured and conciliatory response from Mr. 
McNiffe by reply dated the 12th of January 2000. Mr. McNiffe explained 
the mid-description in the roster as an oversight and sought flexibility on 
the respondent’s part in giving the training programme a chance to 
work. He explained that in the 12 years since the respondent had been in 
store management much had changed and that it was important that the 
respondent re-learn the business from the ground up. The respondent 
was requested to return to work the following Monday.  
 
By letter dated 21st February 2001 the respondent’s solicitors advised 
the Appellant that the respondent’s treating surgeon had indicated that 
the respondent might return to work but that before doing so the 
respondent required confirmation in relation to the training programme 
and his future career path and that a communication be circulated to all 
management and staff within Head Office and all stores to correct the 
mis-description in the Drapery Analysis Management Analysis. 
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 There was further correspondence but ultimately a meeting was arranged 
for the 7th of March 2001 between the respondent and his solicitor and 
Mr. McNiffe and the appellant’s solicitor and at which a stenographer 
retained by the respondent attended. Following the meeting Mr. McNiffe 
wrote to the respondent setting out the matter which he considered to 
have been agreed and this gave rise to further disagreement and further 
correspondence. The first matter in issue was the length of time before 
the Respondent would proceed to a position as Store Manager or 
Regional Manager. Mr. McNiffe suggested that this could take 18 
months with an initial position as No.2 before progressing to a position 
of No.1 in store management. The respondent was insisting on a time 
scale of three to six months rather than the twelve months mentioned by 
Mrs. Heffernan at the meeting of the 23rd of November 2000 
notwithstanding that he had only attended for work in Blanchardstown 
for four days since that meeting. The second related to the training 
programme and the extent to which the respondent should be involved in 
its preparation.  
 
The first matter was not resolved prior to the respondent leaving his 
employment. On the second matter, while a training programme was 
produced on the 8th of March 2001, the respondent’s solicitors raised in 
correspondence a number of points in relation to same with which Mr. 
McNiffe was not prepared to agree. A third matter was in relation to the 
Drapery Management Analysis and concerned the text of an 
announcement made. The announcement as circulated was not in the 
terms agreed.  
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The learned trial judge held that the substance of the announcement was 
as agreed and she did not consider the variations to be of significance. 
The circulation was narrower, Laffoy J. held, than the respondent was 
entitled to expect.  
 
The Respondent returned to work towards the end of April 2001. His 
solicitors continued to raise issues on his behalf in correspondence. He 
continued to work until the 15th of May 2001. On the 15th of May 2001 
the respondent was rostered for duty from 10.00am to 8.30pm but 
incorrectly believed that he had been rostered for duty from 8.30am to 
6.00pm. He attended at 8.30am. During the morning Mr. Sills the Store 
Manager made it clear to the respondent that he was required to attend 
until 8.30pm and there were heated exchanges. Mr. Sills made it clear 
that he was the respondent’s superior and the respondent’s reply was 
that Mr. Sills could deal with his solicitor. He did not work until 
8.30pm. The learned trial judge found that in relation to this incident the 
respondent was in the wrong and that Mr. Sills’ conduct was 
understandable. 
 
By letter dated 30th May 2001 the respondent’s solicitors wrote to the 
appellant’s solicitors as follows: -  
 
“We refer to our letters of 1 May and 9 May, neither of which 
have received a response. Our client has kept us closely advised 
of the developments at his place of employment which have had a 
severely adverse effect on his health. We have advised our client 
that the company has repudiated its obligations towards him as 
an employee. Our client has written the enclosed letter to Mrs. 
Margaret Heffernan. 
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We have been instructed to seek damages against the company in 
relation to the company’s repudiation of the contract of 
employment and to the reckless imposition by the company of 
physical and emotional suffering on our client including an 
abusive verbal attack on our client by a senior manage in the 
presence of other members of management and staff. Unless we 
receive from the company within seven days of the date of this 
letter, adequate proposals to compensate our client, proceedings 
will issue without any further notice. In that event we shall be 
obliged for your confirmation that you have authority to accept 
service of such proceedings on behalf of your client.”  
 
The letter from the respondent enclosed therewith complained that the 
appellant had failed to honour his understanding of the meeting of the 7th 
of March 2001. He complained of the altercation with Mr. Sills on the 
15th of May 2001. Finally, he complained that his working environment 
was hostile to his health and in consequence he had been advised by his 
Consultant to cease working in that environment. 
 
Thereafter the respondent was out of work for a period of approximately 
8 months. At the end of January 2002 he obtained a position as a buyer 
with another retail group on terms no less favourable than those which 
he had enjoyed with the appellant.  
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 8.2.2 The Findings of the High Court  
 
On the evidence Laffoy J. in the High Court made, inter alia, the 
following findings: -  
 
(1) It was an implied term of the plaintiff’s contract of 
employment that the defendant s acting reasonably could 
assign him from one work location to another and from 
one management function to another appropriate 
management function. 
 
(2) It was an implied term of the plaintiff’s contract of 
employment that both the employer and employee would 
maintain mutual trust and confidence. The defendant was 
in breach of that term after the 23rd of November 2000 
since the manner in which the defendant dealt with the 
plaintiff in the knowledge of the precarious nature of his 
physical and psychological health viewed objectively 
amounted to oppressive conduct. It was likely to seriously 
damage their employer/employee relationship and it did 
so. 
 
(3) A breach by an employer of its implied contractual 
obligation to maintain the trust and confidence of an 
employee is a breach which goes to the root of the 
contract.  
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The learned trial judge did not think it would be proper to draw the 
inference suggested by the defendant from the plaintiff’s conduct that 
the plaintiff had no real intention of giving the change to store 
management a chance to work. Laffoy J. stated that: -  
 
“…some of his behaviour might be characterised as 
unreasonable, but I think this is attributable to the fact that his 
trust in the defendant’s senior management and executives had 
been shattered rather than to any grand design to leave the 
defendant with a severance package or compensation.” 
 
Also, in relation to the defendant solicitors’ responses to the plaintiff’s 
solicitors correspondence being send directly to his home, sometimes by 
courier and sometimes on Saturday, the learned trial judge was of the 
view that there was no doubt that this course adopted heightened the 
distrust of the plaintiff. 
 
In relation to the claim for breach of contract as pleaded and pursued 
before the High Court by Counsel on behalf of the plaintiff, the essence 
of this aspect of his claim being that the plaintiff was constructively and 
wrongfully dismissed by the defendant , the learned trial judged stated 
that, in her view: 
 
“[T]he plaintiff’s submission that there was a series of breaches 
of contract on the part of the defendant and that the accumulation 
of those breaches resulted in a repudiation by the defendant of 
the plaintiff’s contract is not correct. The correct interpretation 
of what happened is that the manner in which the defendant dealt 
with the plaintiff in the knowledge of the precarious nature of his 
physical and psychological health viewed objectively amounted 
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to oppressive conduct. It was likely to seriously damage their 
employer/employee relationship and it did so. Accordingly, the 
defendant breached its obligation to maintain the plaintiff’s trust 
and confidence.”  
 
8.2.3 The Approach of the Supreme Court  
 
Finnegan J., delivering the Judgment of the Supreme Court, adopted the 
test as set out in Malik wherein Lord Steyn had considered the correct 
approach to the question of whether the implied obligation had been 
breached and said: 
 
“…given the existence of an obligation of trust and confidence, it 
is important to approach the question of a breach of that 
obligation correctly. Mr. Douglas Brodie of Edinburgh 
University, in his helpful article to which I have already referred 
put the matter succinctly, at pp. 121-122:  
 
‘In assessing whether there has been a breach, it seems 
clear that what is significant is the impact of the 
employer’s behaviour on the employee rather than what 
the employer intended. Moreover, the impact will be 
assessed objectively’. 
 
Both of Mr. Brodie’s reservations seem to me to reflect classic 
contract law principles and I would gratefully adopt his 
statement.”61  
 
                                                 
61 Ibid at p.622 
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Elaborating on the objective nature of the test Lord Steyn went on to 
say: 
 
“The implied obligation extends to any conduct by the employer 
likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of trust and 
confidence between the employer and the employee. It may well 
be, as the Court of Appeal observes, that the decided cases 
involved instances of conduct which might be described as  
 
‘conduct involving rather more direct treatment of employees’ 
 
[1996] ICR 406, 412, so be it but Lord Justice Morritt held that 
the obligation:  
 
‘may be broken not only by an act directed at a particular 
employee but also by conduct which, when viewed objectively, is 
likely to seriously damage the relationship of employer and 
employee.’  
 
That is the correct approach. The motives of the employer cannot 
be determinative, or even relevant, in judging the employee’s 
claims for damages for breach of the implied obligation. If 
conduct objectively considered is likely to cause serious damage 
to the relationship between employer and employee a breach of 
the implied obligation may arise.” 
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In relation to the test, the Supreme Court in Berber stated that the 
following matters are to be noted: -  
 
1. The test is objective. 
 
2. The test requires that the conduct of both employer and employee 
be considered. 
 
3. The conduct of the parties as a whole and the accumulative effect 
must be looked at. 
 
4. The conduct of the employer complained of must be unreasonable 
and without proper cause and its effect on the employee must be 
judged objectively, reasonably and sensibly in order to determine 
if it is such that the employee cannot be expected to put up with 
it.  
 
8.2.4 The Findings of the Supreme Court  
 
Applying the appropriate test to the conduct of the respondent in the 
Berber case, the Supreme Court focused only on the events which 
occurred after the 23rd of November 2000. 
 
The Supreme Court found that in circumstances where the appellant was 
first notified that stress was exacerbating the respondent’s Crohn’s 
disease on receipt of the solicitor’s letter of the 7th of December 2000, 
there was no evidence to justify a conclusion the appellant was aware of 
the respondent’s mental condition during the events prior to this date 
(such as on the 27th of November 2000 when he was instructed to report 
to Blanchardstown and did not do so).  The Supreme Court went on to 
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conclude that on application of an objective test to the suspension of the 
respondent with pay, it could not be said that the same was unreasonable 
and found that the appellant acted bona fide and within its rights in 
deciding to move the respondent. 
 
Further, in the view of Finnegan J., the respondent’s refusal to co-
operate until such time as he should speak to Mrs. Heffernan was 
unreasonable. The following passage of law as stated by Smyth J. in 
Harrington v Irish Life and Permanent Plc62 was affirmed: 
 
  “(a) The following basic principles are applicable: -  
 
1. the employer impliedly contracts to obey the lawful 
and reasonable orders of his employer (or his 
employee’s delegate) within the scope of the 
employment he contracted to undertake. Chitty on 
Contracts (24th ed. Vol. 2 para. 37 – 050); and 
 
2. it has long been part of our law that a person 
expudiates the contract of service if he wilfully 
disobeys the lawful and reasonable orders of his 
Master. Such a refusal fully justifies an employer in 
dismissing him summarily. 
 
(Per Karminski L.J. in Pepper v Webb [1969] 2 All ER 
216 at 218, cited with approval and adopted by Hamilton 
J. as he then was in Brewster v Burke & Anor [1985] 4 
JISLL 98 at p.100).”  
 
                                                 
62 Supra, n 55 
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Finnegan J. viewed the suspension with pay to be significantly less 
draconian than seeking to dismiss the respondent following his refusal to 
comply with the direction given to him and objectively considered the 
respondent’s conduct as unreasonable. The learned judge highlighted the 
fact that on hearing from the respondent’s solicitor by letter dated 7th 
December 2000 the appellant gave an unequivocal assurance of 
willingness to overlook the incidents provided the respondent returned 
to work as soon as his doctor should certify him as fit to do so.  
 
Finnegan J. viewed the exchange in relation to the dress code for 
managers as one which would justify concerns in the appellant as to the 
course of future interaction with the respondent. It is submitted that 
while the respondent’s request to have the dress code put into writing 
could be seen as further evidence of the employee’s loss of trust and 
confidence in the employer and its subordinates, it was concluded by the 
Supreme Court that the occurrence “is neutral for present purposes 
neither party having acted unreasonably.”  
 
In dealing with the matter of the training plan, Finnegan J. understood 
Laffoy J. findings that the appellant was aware of the respondent’s 
vulnerability at the date of preparation of same, to mean the normal 
anxiety and concern which any employee might feel on a significant 
change in his employment taking place and did not consider the 
appellant’s course of conduct to the training plan to be unreasonable or 
oppressive. 
 
The final matter dealt with by the Supreme Court under the breach of 
contract element of the Appeal was what occurred on the 15th of May 
2001 when the respondent incorrectly believe that he had been rostered 
for duty from 8.30am to 6.00pm. Finnegan J. viewed the respondent’s 
failure to work beyond 6.00pm and his final salvo to Mr. Sills that he 
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could deal with his solicitor as being part of a consistent pattern of 
conduct in circumstances where the respondent objected to written 
communications to him being sent to him directly and the requirement 
he had that all such communications be sent to his solicitor.  
 
On this point of appeal, Finnegan J. concluded: 
 
“…I am satisfied that the conduct of the appellant judged 
objectively was not such as to amount to a repudiation of the 
contract of employment. The conduct judged objectively did not 
evince an intention not to be bound by the contract of 
employment. On the other hand the conduct of the respondent 
was in the instances mentioned above unreasonable or in error 
and the employer’s conduct must be considered in the light of 
same. In these circumstances the purported acceptance of 
repudiation of the contract of employment by the respondent was 
neither justified nor effective. The respondent must fail on his 
claim under this heading.”  
 
8.3 Conclusion  
 
It is clear that the critical factor in persuading Laffoy J. that the 
employer was guilty of “oppressive conduct” was the employer’s 
knowledge that the respondent was suffering from stress as a result of 
the dispute between him and his employer however the judgment of the 
Supreme Court is authority for the proposition that evidence of an 
employee’s loss of trust and confidence in his/her employer will now 
necessarily require a high standard of proof.  
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It is unfortunate that, while the test is objective, the opinion of the 
presiding Judges in these types of cases is inevitably subjective. For 
example, while Finnegan J. viewed the respondent’s failure to work 
beyond 6.00pm and his final salvo to Mr. Sills that he could deal with 
his solicitor as being part of a consistent pattern of conduct which was in 
the instances mentioned above unreasonable or in error and the 
employer’s conduct must be considered in the light of same, such a 
pattern of conduct by the respondent could equally be viewed as further 
evidence of an absence of trust and confidence in his employer.  
 
While there is remains a limited amount of guidance in these or any 
other authorities as to what constitutes a breach of the implied obligation 
of trust and confidence, the approach adopted by Laffoy J. in the Berber 
case was possibly seen by the Supreme Court as posing unique 
difficulties for an employer and perhaps setting too high a standard for 
those who are dealing with employees who are claiming to be stressed 
as a result of an employment dispute, particularly where the essential 
matter in dispute relates to the issue of a lawful instruction, an entirely 
commonplace allegation in the context of employment law.  
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Chapter 9  
 
Repudiation, The Last Straw & Constructive Dismissal 
 
9.1 Repudiation
 
As to whether conduct amounts to a repudiation of the contract the 
ordinary law of contract applies: the cumulative effect of the acts 
complained of must be such as to indicate that a party had repudiated its 
contract.63  
 
By reference to McDermott Contract Law64 the test as to whether a 
breach of contract amounts to repudiation is whether the breach goes to 
the root of the contract. A breach by an employer of its implied 
contractual obligation to maintain the trust and confidence of an 
employee is a breach which goes to the root of the contract.   
 
It had earlier been held in Woods v W.M. Car Services (Peterborough) 
Limited65 by Browne-Wilkinson J. following Courthaulds Northern 
Textiles Limited v Andrew66 that any breach of the implied term that the 
employers will not, without reasonable and proper cause, conduct 
themselves in the manner calculated or likely to destroy or seriously 
damage the relationship of confidence and trust between employer and 
employee was a fundamental breach amounting to a repudiation since it 
necessarily went to the root of the contract.  
 
 
                                                 
63 Brown v Merchant Ferries Limited [1998] I.R.L.R. 682  
64 McDermott, P.A., 2001.Contract Law. Dublin: Buttersworths, 2001.   
65 [1981] I.R.L.R. 347  
66 Supra, n.13  
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This statement was not accepted by the Court of Appeal in Bliss67 and 
neither was it accepted by Douglas Brodie in his aforementioned 
article68 which was referred to with approval in both Malik and Browne 
v Merchant Ferries Limited69.  
 
Where the repudiatory breach alleged is of the trust and confidence 
term: 
 
“The misconduct of the employer amounting to breach must be 
serious indeed since it amounts to constructive dismissal and as 
such entitles the employee to leave immediately without any 
notice on discovering it. The test is whether the employer’s 
conduct is such that the employee cannot reasonably be expected 
to tolerate it a moment longer after he has discovered it and can 
walk out of his job without prior notice.”70
 
It is accepted that an employer may engage in conduct which is ‘out of 
order’  without thereby repudiating the contract, although repeated 
behaviour of that kind may be a different matter.71
 
As considered above, the test to be applied is not subjective. The 
employee’s actual perception is not material. The test is an objective 
one; this is whether viewed objectively, the employer’s conduct so 
impacted on the employee that the employee could properly conclude 
that the employer was repudiating the contract. In other words, a Court 
must be satisfied that the conduct of the employer judged objectively did 
not evince an intention not to be bound by the contract of employment 
                                                 
67 Bliss v South East Thames Regional Health Authority [1985] I.R.L.R. 308 
68 Supra, n.20  
69 Supra, n.63  
70 BCCI v Ali (No. 2) [2000] I.C.R. 1354 at p.1376H 
71 Cantor Fitzgerald v Bird [2002] I.R.L.R. 867 
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and therefore a purported acceptance of repudiation of a contract of 
employment by an employee is neither justified nor effective.  
 
9.2 The Last Straw  
 
In Lewis v Motorworld Garages Limited72, it was seen to be perfectly 
proper for Counsel for the employee to: 
 
“…accumulate the breaches to found the submission that the 
totality of the wrongful course of conduct entitled the employee to 
claim that the employer had evinced an intention no longer to be 
bound by the contract of employment.”73
 
This was in circumstances where some of the acts or incidents, which 
formed part of a course of conduct, when viewed in isolation, seemed 
“quite trivial”.  
 
It was held in Omilaju v Waltham Forest London Borough Council74 
that the quality that a “last straw” had to possess was that it was an act in 
a series whose cumulative effect amounted to a breach of the implied 
term. The essential quality of that act was that, when taken in 
conjunction with the earlier acts on which an employee relied, it 
amounted to a breach of the implied term of trust and confidence. 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
72 [1986] I.C.R. 157 
73 Ibid at p.165  
74 [2005] 1 All. E.R. 75 
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9.3 Constructive Dismissal
 
Mr. Justice Finnegan on delivering the Judgment of the Supreme Court 
in Berber v Dunnes Stores, adopted the law on constructive dismissal as 
summarised by Mr. Justice Browne-Wilkinson in Lewis as follows: - 
 
“1. In order to prove that he has suffered constructive 
dismissal an employee who leaves his employment must 
prove that he did so as a result of a breach of contract by 
his employer, which shows that the employer no longer 
intends to be bound by an essential term of the contract: 
see Western Excavating (E.C.C.) Limited v Sharp75. 
 
2. However, there are normally implied in a contract of 
employment mutual rights and obligations of trust and 
confidence. A breach of this implied term may justify the 
employee in leaving and claiming that he has been 
constructively dismissed: see Post Office v Roberts76 and 
Woods v W.M. Car Services (Peterborough) Limited77.  
 
3. The breach of this implied obligation of trust and 
confidence may consist of a series of actions on the part of 
the employer which cumulatively amount to a breach of 
the term, though each individual incident may not do so. In 
particular in such a case the last action of the employer 
which leads to the employee leaving need not itself be a 
breach of contract; the question is, does the cumulative 
series of acts taken together amount to a breach of the 
                                                 
75 [1978] I.C.R. 221 
76 [1980] I.R.L.R. 347 
77 Supra, n.65, at 670 per Browne-Wilkinson J. 
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implied term. See Woods W.M. Car Services 
(Peterborough) Limited78. This is the ‘last straw’ 
situation.”  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
78 Supra, n.65  
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Chapter 10 
 
The Mutuality of the Duty  
 
10.1 Introduction 
 
The obligation of fidelity is plainly mutual: as Laffoy J. described it in 
the Berber case, this reciprocal duty is “a two-way street”. Thus it also 
imposes duties on the employee including to obey lawful and reasonable 
instructions. 
 
Indeed, it has been successfully used by an employer to limit ‘work to 
rule’ as a tool of industrial action. In Secretary of State v ASLEF 
(No.2)79, it was held that an employee must not frustrate the commercial 
objectives of the employer be seeking to carry out instructions in an 
unreasonable way.   
 
10.2 The Relevancy of the Cumulative Conduct of the Parties  
 
With regard to the application of the implied term to both the employer 
and the employee, Mr. Justice Finnegan in delivering the Judgment of 
the Supreme Court in Berber referred to the case of Woods v W.M. Car 
Services (Peterborough) Limited80 and quoted the following passage of 
Browne-Wilkinson J.:  
 
“In our view it is clearly established that there is implied in a 
contract of employment a term that the employers will not, 
without reasonable and proper cause, conduct themselves in a 
                                                 
79 [1972] Q.B. 455 
80 Supra, n.65  
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manner calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the 
relationship of trust and confidence between the employer and 
employee; Courtaulds Northern Textiles Limited v Andrew 
[1979] IRLR 84. To constitute a breach of this implied term it is 
not necessary to show that the employer intended any repudiation 
of the contract; the Tribunal’s function is to look at the 
employer’s conduct as a whole and determine whether it is such 
that its effect, judged reasonably and sensibly, is such that the 
employee cannot be expected to put up with it: see British 
Aircraft Corporation Limited v Austin [1978] IRLR 332 and Post 
Office v Roberts [1980] IRLR 347. The conduct of the parties has 
to be looked at as a whole and its cumulative impact assessed; 
Post Office v Roberts.”   
 
10.3 Conclusion  
 
While it is accepted that the obligation is a “two-way” street, the greater 
interest in the term lies in the impact that the duty of mutual trust and 
confidence has had on the employer’s obligations.  
 
It is submitted that the weight of this principle of mutuality is in the 
consideration of parties’ conduct as a whole and the consequent 
assessment of impact on a cumulative basis. This is a practical approach 
as it takes into account human nature in terms of how one’s reaction will 
naturally be correlative to one’s treatment. It is contended however that 
such a principle again appears to allow for an element of subjectivity in 
what is supposed to be an objectively tested area of law. If the conduct 
of the parties as a whole is considered relevant than it cannot be said that 
the test is an objective one as this necessarily takes into account the 
relationship of the parties who are the subject of the proceedings and not 
merely the reasonable man. Rather, it is the reasonable man in light of 
 68
the particular relationship and this, it is contended, is not a wholly 
objective test. Additionally, as was seen in the Berber case, what is 
reasonable to one Judge many not be reasonable to another and it is 
respectfully suggested therefore that the existing approach of the 
judiciary to such matters is overly susceptible to variability which leads 
to a lack of guiding precedence and tremulous litigation.  
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Chapter 11  
 
Implications of the recognition of the Implied Duty in the context of the 
Employment Injunction  
 
11.1 Introduction 
 
Traditionally, the courts have been reluctant to grant an injunction which 
would  involve an element of ongoing supervision and in service or 
trading contracts because it is very difficult to assess whether such 
orders are being obeyed. A further reason for the courts’ reluctance to 
grant injunctions specifically in relation to contracts for personal 
services is that as a matter of policy it is undesirable to force individuals 
to work together where a relationship of trust and confidence no longer 
exists between them. So, it is generally accepted that in the context of 
contracts for personal services, an injunction should not be granted 
where this would indirectly provide for specific performance of the 
positive terms of the contract.81  
 
As Kelly J stated in Reynolds v Malocco82: 
 
“Normally courts will not grant an injunction to restrain 
breaches of a covenant in a contract of employment if that would 
amount to indirect specific performance of such contract or 
would perpetuate a relationship based on mutual trust which no 
longer exists”.83
 
                                                 
81 Delany, H., 2006. Employment Injunctions: The Role of Mutual Trust and Confidence (2006) 28 
D.U.L.J. 363 
82 [1999] 2 I.R. 203 
83 Ibid at p.209  
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Kenny J. had put the principle more rigidly when in Yeates v Minister 
for Posts and Telegraphs84 he stated, “it is settled law that the courts 
never specifically enforce a contract for personal services.”85  
 
However, it has also been acknowledged that this rule “is plainly not 
absolute and without exception”.86  
 
The courts have developed a realistic attitude towards the question of 
whether an injunction is appropriate in such cases. In Page One Records 
Ltd v Britton87 Stamp J. refused to grant an injunction which as a 
practical matter would have forced the defendants to employ the 
plaintiffs in a fiduciary capacity in circumstances where they “for 
reasons good, bad or indifferent” had “lost confidence” in them.88   
 
This approach was further developed by the Court of Appeal in Warren 
v Mendy89 where the court declined to grant an injunction to restrain the 
defendant from inducing a breach of contract where its effect would 
arguably have been to force an individual to perform his agreement with 
the plaintiff. Nourse LJ said that an injunction would less readily be 
granted where there are obligations of mutual trust and confidence and 
the servant’s confidence in his master has genuinely gone. This will also 
be true where an employer has lost trust and confidence in his employee. 
 
It is a well-established principle that a limited exception exists however 
to the normal rule of no intervention by way of an injunction, namely 
where a relationship of mutual trust and confidence persists. Therefore, 
the continuing presence or absence of such a relationship can be of 
                                                 
84 [1978] I.L.R.M. 22 
85 Ibid at p.24  
86 CH Giles Co. v Morris [1972] 1 WLR 307 at p.319 
87 [1968] 1 W.L.R. 157 
88 Ibid at p.168  
89 [1989] 1 W.L.R. 853 
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particular significance to a court in determining whether to consider 
making an order which would have the effect of obliging parties to 
continue working together.  
 
11.2 Tracing the Limited Exception 
 
The starting point in tracing the limited exception to the general 
principle that employer and employee should not be forced to work 
together in the English jurisdiction is the decision of the majority of the 
Court of Appeal in Hill v CA Parsons & Co Ltd90 where an injunction 
was granted against an employer to restrain an alleged wrongful 
dismissal after the employer had reluctantly been forced to terminate the 
contract of employment of an engineer who had refused to join a trade 
union. Lord Denning MR stated: 
 
“If ever there was a case where an injunction should be granted 
against the employers, this is the case.”91
 
The majority of the court justified its decision on the basis that a 
relationship of mutual trust and confidence still existed between the 
parties. 
 
The importance of establishing continuing mutual confidence if a court 
is to intervene in an employment dispute is also clear from the decision 
of Taylor J in Hughes v London Borough of Southwark92 where he 
granted an interlocutory injunction restraining the defendant s from 
seeking to enforce an instruction to the plaintiffs that they should carry 
out duties other than their normal work. Taylor J stated that: 
                                                 
90 [1972] Ch. 305 
91 Ibid at p.316  
92 [1988] I.R.L.R. 72 
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 “the important criterion is as to whether there is mutual 
confidence, the point being that it would be inappropriate to 
grant an injunction against an employer requiring him to keep on 
in service on certain terms a servant who has lost the confidence 
of that employer.”93
 
He said that the defendant s continued to have “great confidence” in the 
plaintiffs and added that it would be quite strong to assume that simply 
because there is a dispute between an employer and employee that 
mutual confidence has gone.  
 
The concept of a continuing relationship of mutual trust has been 
overstretched in some cases94 and it is submitted that a realistic 
approach to the concept is that adopted by Morland J in Robb v 
Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council95 wherein the 
learned judged granted an interlocutory injunction restraining the 
Defendant s from giving effect to a dismissal notice made against him. 
In this view the submission made by Counsel for the Defendants that 
unless trust and confidence between the employer and employee 
remains, an injunction to preserve the contract of employment should 
never be granted, was “far too sweeping”.  
 
Morland J. acknowledged, however, that if an injunction is sought to 
reinstate an employee dismissed in breach of contract, clearly trust and 
confidence are highly relevant as without the confidence of his employer 
in his ability to do his job, an employee’s position would be untenable. 
In his view “the all important criterion is whether the Order sought is 
                                                 
93 Ibid at p.73  
94 See Irani v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Health Authority [1985] I.R.L.R. 203 and 
Powell v London Borough of Brent [1987] I.R.L.R. 466 
95 [1991] I.C.R. 514 
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workable”96 and he concluded that despite “the very cogent evidence of 
loss of trust and confidence,” the balance of convenience required him 
to grant the relief sought which was effectively confined to ensuring a 
resumption of the appropriate disciplinary procedure initiated against the 
Plaintiff.  
 
The effect of the relief sought was fundamental to the court’s decision. 
The Plaintiff was essentially seeking to ensure that fair procedures were 
followed in the conduct of disciplinary proceedings rather than 
reinstatement. As Redmond has commented in reference the case of 
Jones v Lee97 where the Court of Appeal had granted an injunction to 
restrain the dismissal of a Plaintiff without a hearing even in 
circumstances where his employers appeared to have lost trust and 
confidence in him: “Trust and confidence in the Plaintiff’s ability to do 
the job had no relevance to the workability of the disciplinary procedure 
if ordered by the court”.98  
 
11.3 The Limited Exception in Ireland  
 
The courts in this jurisdiction have traditionally accepted that as a 
general principle, a plaintiff will not be entitled to an interlocutory 
injunction which would amount to an indirect order of specific 
performance in respect of a contract of employment.99  
 
 
 
                                                 
96 Ibid at p.520  
97 [1980] I.C.R. 310 
98 Supra, n.48 
99 Evans v IRFB Services (Ireland) Ltd [2005] 2 I.L.R.M. 358 
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This principle was set out in the following terms by Costello P in Phelan 
v BIC (Ireland) Ltd100: 
 
“There is a general principle that the courts do not grant 
injunctions in cases of termination of employment on the 
principle in the old law reports and text books that a contract of 
employment is a contract of personal service. But there has been 
a strong body of judgment and authorities that this old rule 
should be subject to qualifications and in a number of cases the 
courts have granted interlocutory relief where it is in the interests 
of justice to do so.”  
 
In Becker v Board of Management of St Dominic’s Secondary School101 
Clarke J went on to say that there may be exceptions to the general 
proposition such as a case where an employer has failed to make out any 
arguable basis for a suspension, or has been guilty of an inordinate and 
unjust delay in concluding an investigation, as in Martin v Nationwide 
Building Society102.  
 
The classic starting point in this jurisdiction in terms of the 
establishment of exceptions to the general principle is the judgment of 
Costello J. in Fennelly v Assicuraziono Generali S PA103 wherein he 
said that he accepted that the court should not require an employer to 
continue working with an employee where serious difficulties have 
arisen between them or where there is no work for the employee. 
However, in the serious case before him he was satisfied that the parties 
continued to have “the highest regard for one another” and he made an 
order that the defendant should continue to pay his salary until the trial, 
                                                 
100 [1985] I.L.T. 73 
101 [2005] 1 I.R. 561 at p.570 
102 Supra, n.37 
103[1985] 3 I.L.T.R. 73 
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leaving it to the defendant to decide whether to require the latter to carry 
out any duties he might be given or to grant him leave of absence.  
 
In Moore v Xnet Informations Systems Ltd104 it was confirmed that the 
courts will be unwilling to grant an interlocutory injunction requiring an 
employee’s reinstatement pending trial at any rate where relations 
between the parties have broken down to a significant degree.  While 
O’Sullivan J. was satisfied that the Plaintiff had made out a fair 
argument that he had been wrongfully dismissed, having regard to the 
fact that relations between the parties had irretrievably broken down, the 
learned judge stated that the balance of convenience did not favour an 
order directing the defendant to reinstate the plaintiff pending the 
hearing of the case. O’Sullivan J. concluded that the balance of 
convenience favoured granting an order directing the defendant to 
continue to pay the plaintiff’s salary and other benefits until the trial 
subject to an undertaking by the Plaintiff to do any work he was required 
to do. 
 
Smyth J. in Hennessy v St. Gerard’s School Trust105 came to a contrary 
conclusion to that reached by O’Sullivan J. in circumstances where 
neither reinstatement nor an order restraining the defendant  from giving 
effect to a purported dismissal were granted. Smyth J. stated that the 
“mutuality of respect and trust” had been fractured by the events which 
had taken place and that if damages were to be awarded they would be 
capable of ascertainment and calculation. In the circumstances he was 
satisfied that the plaintiff’s application for interlocutory injunctions 
restraining the defendant from dismissing her or from appointing anyone 
else to a particular position in the school must be refused. 
 
                                                 
104 [2002] 2 I.L.R.M. 278 
105 Unreported, High Court, Smyth J., 30th July, 2003. 
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11.4 Conclusion 
 
It appears that while orders restraining the implementation of a 
purported dismissal or termination of appointment may be obtained, 
even where the relationship of mutual trust and confidence between the 
parties has broken down, such orders will be made on limited terms. In 
the absence of a continuing relationship of trust and confidence it is 
generally accepted however there is no basis on which to make an order 
requiring parties to continue to work together even on a temporary basis 
or conditional upon certain undertakings from the plaintiff. 
 
It can be said that the significance of the relationship of trust and 
confidence will largely depend on the type of interlocutory relief being 
sought, of which it could broadly be said there are four which tend to 
arise in these situations: 
 
1. Orders to ensure the continued payment of salary;  
2. Orders to ensure the continuation of other benefits pending trial; 
3. Orders restraining the implementation of a purported dismissal; 
and  
4. Orders requiring the Plaintiff’s reinstatement. 
 
As to the first and second type, as was seen in Fennelly106 above, a good 
relationship continued between the parties however this requirement was 
subsequently viewed as disposable in all but a few cases where an order 
for payment of a plaintiff’s salary was sought.107  
 
                                                 
106 Supra, n.103  
107 For example: Orr v Zomax Ltd [2004] 1 I.R. 486, Carroll v Dublin Bus [2005] E.L.R. 192  
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Similarly, orders restraining the appointment of another person to a 
position which the plaintiff claims is effectively his, are now fairly 
consistently granted even where the relationship between the parties 
appears to have broken down.108  
 
There is more a lack of consistency of approach in relation to the last 
two categories. There is evidence in some of the decisions made by the 
courts in England such as Irani v Southampton and South-West 
Hampshire Health Authority109 and Powell v London Borough of 
Brent110 of claiming that the employer had not lost confidence in the 
employee where working relationships were clearly extremely strained. 
It is submitted that the correct approach is that taken by Laffoy J. in 
Courtenay v Radio 2000 Ltd111 where she simply made an order 
restraining the implementation of the Plaintiff’s purported dismissal 
pending trial and there was no question of determining whether mutual 
trust remained as she declined to make an order reinstating the Plaintiff 
which would have required the parties to continue to work together.  
 
A distinguishing feature of many of the decisions made is that the courts 
often appear to be acting in order to ensure compliance with the rules of 
natural justice and the proper application of disciplinary procedures.112 
There is therefore no need to establish an ongoing good relationship 
between the parties as it is not contemplated that they would continue to 
work together pending trial. To this extent it is arguable that the concept 
of the importance of a continuing relationship of mutual trust and 
confidence in cases where interlocutory injunctive relief is sought in an 
                                                 
108 Powell v London Borough of Brent [1987] I.R.L.R. 466, Supra, n.99  
109 [1985] I.R.L.R. 203 
110 Supra, n.108 
111 Unreported, High Court, Laffoy J., 22nd July 1997. 
112 For example Maher v Irish Permanent plc [1998] E.L.R. 77 
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employment context could now in many instances be described as 
something of a red herring.113  
 
It is becoming increasingly clear that the modern interpretation of the 
concept of mutual trust and confidence is that it is prescriptive in nature 
and it effectively obliges the parties to a contract of employment to 
behave in a manner which will preserve the relationship between them. 
This is a shift away from the traditional view of a relationship of trust 
and confidence as an essential prerequisite to the effective functioning of 
the employer/employee relationship and previously in considering 
whether interlocutory relief might be granted on an exceptional basis the 
court would seek to determine whether this relationship was still intact.  
 
Professor Delany opines that the growing acceptance of the principle 
that the relationship of mutual trust and confidence between employer 
and employee gives rise to rights and obligations on both sides should 
undoubtedly make it easier for an employee to obtain interlocutory 
injunctive relief to ensure that for example an employer observes 
accepted standards of natural justice in pursing disciplinary proceedings 
against him. She considers that it would therefore be ironic if the 
absence of a continuing relationship of mutual trust and confidence in 
the traditional sense of that term were to work against an employee who 
might be refused an injunction on the grounds that this relationship no 
longer existed between the parties.114  
 
 
                                                 
113 See supra, n.81  
114 Supra, n.81  
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Bolger & Ryan submit that given the increasing tendency to see 
injunctions restraining disciplinary proceedings115 which is probably 
encouraged by the difficulty in now obtaining injunctive relief to restrain 
a dismissal, this is an area where further analysis of the implied duty of 
trust and fidelity may be seen in the future. 116  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
115 A recent example being the case of Minnock v Irish Casing Company Ltd and Robert Stewart, 
Unreported, High Court, Clarke J., May 24, 2007.  
116 Supra, n.4 
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Chapter 12  
 
Implications of the Recognition of the Implied Duty on the Development of 
the Law Relating to Discretionary Bonuses  
 
12.1 Introduction  
 
There have been some interesting recent developments in recognising an 
employee’s right to payment of a bonus, even where the employer has 
attempted to restrict the entitlement to payment on the exercise of the 
employer’s discretion, thereby leaving the employee who might be out 
of favour with their employer or former employer in a very vulnerable 
position.  
 
It is proposed to consider the circumstances in which the courts will find 
that the mutual duty of trust and confidence between employer and 
employee has implications for claims relating to bonus payments in light 
of recent Irish and English case law involving discretionary bonus 
payment schemes.  
 
12.2 Obligation to Explain a Failure to Pay   
 
It is submitted that requiring an employer to give reasons for non-
payment of a bonus is consistent with the fulfilment of the obligation of 
trust and confidence which underlies the employment relationship. As 
recently observed by Mummery LJ in the English Court of Appeal in 
Commerzbank AG v Keen117: 
 
                                                 
117 [2006] E.W.C.A. Civ. 1536; [2007] I.R.L.R. 132 
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“If the parties have agreed that an employer should have a 
discretion to decide, by reference to certain factors, whether an 
employee should be paid an additional remuneration by way of 
bonus for work done under the contract of employment and, if so, 
how much, the employer is under an obligation to treat his 
employee fairly in explaining the situation.”  
 
Therefore, if a bonus is refused in circumstances where an employee 
might reasonably have expected to receive one, an employer should 
provide an explanation to the employee as to why the bonus has not 
been paid. Such an explanation should include the factors which have 
influence the decision, the name of the person who took the decision (if 
this is unclear) and the reasons for the decision taken.  
 
12.3 “Please Sir, may I have some more?” 
 
Alternatively, if the employee claims to have been awarded a bonus 
which was irrationally small, the employee must show that the amount 
paid by way of bonus is less in amount than the sum that would have 
been paid by another rational and reasonable employer. In Abu Dhabi 
National Tanker Co v Product Star Shipping Ltd (The Product Star) 
(No.2)118 Leggatt LJ read into a contractual discretion the requirement: 
 
“Not only must the discretion be exercised honestly and in good 
faith but, having regard to the provisions of the contract, by 
which it is conferred, it must not be exercised arbitrarily, 
capriciously or unreasonably.”119
  
                                                 
118 [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 397 
119 Ibid at p.404 
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It can be seen from the foregoing that transparency is key in order to 
avoid potential claims where a bonus scheme is operated. Assessments 
should be articulated in rational and objective terms so as to show that 
the decisions were made in good faith and that they were in now way 
arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.120  
 
12.4 Exercising the Discretion  
 
The recent High Court judgment of Finnegan v J&E Davy121 is 
significant in this context. The case concerned a stockbroker who sued 
his former employer for €260,000 in deferred bonus payments earned in 
1998 and 1999. The plaintiff worked for Davy between 1990 and 2000. 
His bonuses were tied to the firm’s profitability and his own 
performance, with the amounts being decided at a yearly meeting with 
his superiors, where his performance was assessed. He did not receive a 
bonus in 1992, but in every other year between 1990 and 1997, he 
earned bonuses of between £3,000 and £30,000. The entire sum was 
paid shortly after the annual review. 
 
In 1997, the firm began deferring part of the payments. The timeline of 
events here is significant. At the beginning of 1998, it was agreed that 
the plaintiff’s bonus for 1997 would be £100,000. He was paid £60,000 
immediately, but £40,000 was deferred for a year. Its payment was 
conditional on his remaining with the firm. The plaintiff objected to this, 
particularly, the condition that he stay with the company, but was told 
that Davy’s biggest shareholder, Bank of Ireland, stipulated tat bonuses 
be paid in this way. It was, however, agreed that he would receive the 
interest earned on the money. A year later, his bonus for 1998 was set at 
                                                 
120 Ryan, R., & Ryan, D., 2007. Employers’ discretion in the determination of bonus payments (2007) 
14(8) C.L.P. 166   
121 [2007] 18 E.L.R. 234 Note: This decision was initially appealed to the Supreme Court but was 
subsequently withdrawn.  
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£200,000, payable in three instalments, the first immediately, the second 
a year later, and the third a year after that. His 1999 bonus was fixed at 
£210,000, payable in tree equal instalments over two years. All deferred 
payments depended on his remaining with the company. The plaintiff 
left Davy’s to join a rival firm in September 2000. As a result, he did not 
receive one instalment of his 1998 bonus and two-thirds of his 1999 
payment, a total equivalent to just over €260,000. He argued that the 
attempt to change the terms of the bonus scheme was: 
 
1. a unilateral attempt by the Defendant  to alter the terms of the 
employment contract which was not accepted by the Plaintiff and 
which was ineffective; 
 
2. in breach of the employment contract as being an irrational 
exercise of the employer’s discretion; and 
 
3. an unenforceable term as being in restraint of trade.  
 
On behalf of the defendant employer, it was argued that such a deferred 
payment scheme was a legitimate means of ‘incentivising’ employees 
and an attempt to generate loyalty. For present purposes, then, the 
question of whether the duty of fidelity of the employee could be 
invoked by the employer to justify its approach to the bonus scheme in 
this case is relevant. Smyth J. emphatically rejected the argument that 
the deferral acted to ‘incentivise’ employees and instead found as a fact 
that the real reason for the deferral was “to create a financial and 
practical restriction on employees who wished to continue to act as 
stockbrokers going to another firm of stockbrokers”.   
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The plaintiff argued that in circumstances where bonus payments were 
calculated by reference to profitability of the firm in a calendar year and 
the individual performance of the plaintiff during that year, it was 
arbitrary and irrational to seek to make the payment of that bonus 
conditional upon the plaintiff remaining in the employment of the 
defendant for the following two years. The effect of this stipulation 
would be to change the criteria for the awarding of the bonus from one 
of profitability and performance to one of loyalty in the future. Smyth J. 
accepted this argument and deemed the provision which amounted to a 
restraint of trade to constitute an improper exercise of discretion. 
Another significant finding of fact in this regard was that those 
employees who left the firm when outstanding elements of bonuses were 
unpaid, but did not go into competition, were paid the outstanding 
monies. This finding of fact supported the conclusion that if the deferral 
provision was part of a contract it was part of a contract in restraint of 
trade.  
 
In concluding that the discretion had been improperly exercised, Smyth 
J. had regard to a number of English authorities including Horkulak v 
Cantor Fitzgerald122 wherein the Court of Appeal laid down the 
principles as to how disputes relating to discretionary bonuses should be 
assessed. Potter LJ accepted that the employee was entitled “to a bona 
fide and rational exercise [by the employers] of their discretion as to 
whether or not to pay him a bonus and in what sum”.123  
 
He further accepted that, although the particular contract did not contain 
any particular formula or point of reference for the calculation of the 
bonus, the obligation was to consider the question of bonus as a rational 
and bona fide exercise when taking into account the criteria adopted for 
                                                 
122 Supra, n.40 
123 Supra n,40 at p.46  
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the purpose of arriving at a decision. Significantly, Potter LJ considered 
that to do otherwise would be to “fly in the face of the principles of trust 
and confidence which have been held to underpin the employment 
relationship”.124  
 
Therefore in assessing the exercise of discretion by the employer 
regarding the bonus at issue in Horkulak the Court of Appeal expressly 
attached weight to the “principles of mutual trust and confidence which 
have been held to underpin the employment relationship”.125  
 
12.5 Putting Targets beyond Reach 
 
In the case of Takacs v Barclays Services Jersey Ltd 126 the implied duty 
of trust and confidence was again seen to exert influence over a dispute 
in relation to a discretionary bonus. Mr. Takacs, an investment banker, 
had failed to meet his targets and was dismissed shortly before he was 
entitled to his bonus for the current bonus year. Importantly, the terms of 
his contract expressly provided that to qualify for the bonus he had to 
meet certain targets. The contract also provided that to be eligible for a 
bonus payment one had to be an employee of the bank on the date for 
payment of the bonus and not working out a notice period at the time the 
award was due.  
 
Mr. Takacs brought a claim for breach of contract. He argued that 
Barclay’s was in breach of the implied duty of mutual trust and 
confidence, the implied duty of “co-operation” and an implied term of 
“anti-avoidance”. Mr. Takacs alleged that the bank had prevented him 
from achieving the targets he needed in order to qualify for the bonus, 
                                                 
124 Supra, n. 40 at p.47  
125 Supra, n.40 at p.47  
126 [2006] I.R.L.R. 877 
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since the bank had recruited a team of specialists who took over the deal 
that he was involved in and forced him out. This, he argued, constituted 
a breach of the implied duty of co-operation which requires employers 
to co-operate with colleagues in the achievement of their targets. He also 
argued that an implied term of “anti-avoidance” meant that employers 
should be prevented from terminating the employment of their staff to 
avoid paying them their substantial bonus entitlements.  
   
Barclays Bank brought a summary judgment application before the 
Queen’s Bench Division of the English High Court. The court held 
however, that Mr. Takac’s claim of breach of the implied terms had a 
real prospect of success and should proceed to a full trial. Whilst it must 
be emphasised that this does not amount to a final ruling, the approach 
taken is significant and provides a clear reminder that the implied duty 
of trust and confidence may influence courts in their assessment of 
bonus disputes.  
 
12.6 Conclusion
 
In light of the English cases considered above together with recent Irish 
case law which has shown strong support for the role of the implied duty 
of trust and confidence in the employment relationship, it appears that 
increased recourse to the implied duty will exert considerable influence 
on the development of the law relating to bonuses in this jurisdiction, 
particularly perhaps in assessing the propriety of the exercise by an 
employer of discretion in relation to such bonuses.   
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Chapter 13  
 
Implications of the recognition of the Implied Duty in the context of the 
Workplace Bullying  
 
13.1 Introduction
 
While bullying in this jurisdiction is a health and safety issue and it 
relies on the general duties and obligations employers owe, under both 
common law and the safety and health legislation, to protect their 
employees from injury at work, it also raises the implied contractual 
term of mutual trust and confidence which is often accompanied by the 
principle of vicarious liability.  
 
13.2 Definition of Workplace Bullying  
 
Bullying has no direct basis in legislation and thus the term has no 
statutory definition. The Task Force on the Prevention of Workplace 
Bullying recommended the following definition in its Report in 2001, 
“Dignity at Work – the Challenge of Workplace Bullying”: 
 
“Workplace Bullying is repeated inappropriate behaviour, direct 
or indirect, whether verbal, physical or otherwise, conducted by 
one or more persons against another or others, at the place of 
work and/or in the course of employment, which could 
reasonably be regarded as undermining the individual’s right to 
dignity at work. 
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An isolated incident of behaviour described in this definition may 
be an affront to dignity at work but as a once off incident is not 
considered to be bullying.”127   
 
Examples of the type of bullying behaviour set out in the Task Force Report 
include: 
 
• Undermining an individual’s right to dignity at work; 
• Humiliation; 
• Intimidation; 
• Verbal abuse; 
• Victimisation; 
• Exclusion and isolation; 
• Intrusion by pestering, spying and stalking; 
• Repeated unreasonable assignments to duties which are obviously 
unfavourable to individual; 
• Repeated requests giving impossible deadlines or impossible tasks; and 
• Implied threats.128  
 
13.3 Vicarious Liability  
 
Where bullying is perpetrated by a supervisor or manager against a 
subordinate then it will represent a breach of an employer’s duty to 
maintain his employee’s trust and confidence.  It is well settled that 
employers are liable for the wrongdoings of their employers if 
committed “within the scope of this employment” by virtue of vicarious 
liability. In many cases the employer the employer will neither be 
                                                 
127 Report of the Task Force on the Prevention of Workplace Bullying, 2001. “Dignity at Work – The 
Challenge of Workplace Bullying”. Dublin: Government Publications.  
128 Ibid at p.2  
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involved in the bullying nor even aware that such bullying is taking 
place, especially with technology making the victims all the more 
accessible to discrete yet effective bullying.129  
 
13.4 Conclusion 
 
 The breach of the employer’s implied duty to maintain trust and 
confidence in respect of workplace bullying is usually claimed as part of 
a personal injury claim and/or constructive dismissal.  
 
Whether creating or condoning an organisational culture that permits 
perpetration of bullying in the workplace would be deemed by the courts 
to be operating the business in a dishonest and corrupt manner along the 
lines of that found in Malik, remains to be seen.130  
 
It is submitted however, that with the significant expansion of the scope 
of the implied term of trust and confidence, employers will be acting in 
breach of this term where they are discourteous, intimidatory or 
insulting, behaviours which are all characteristic of bullying.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
129 O’Connell, A., 2005. Bullying in the Workplace. (2005) 2(4) I.E.L.J. 119 
130 Middlemiss, S. & Hay, O., 2003. “Legal Redress Against Employers for Victims of Workplace 
Bullying – Part 1”. (2003) 21 I.L.T. 287  
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Chapter 14 
   
Waiving a Breach of the Duty  
 
14.1 Introduction 
 
It is possible to waive a breach of the duty of mutual trust and 
confidence. This was evidenced in the Bliss case wherein, while the 
employee was held on the facts not to have done so, such a conclusion 
would have been wholly permissible.  
  
In Malik Lord Steyn stated that the implied term of trust and confidence 
operated as a default rule, and that the parties were free to exclude it or 
modify it.131 This analysis is entirely consistent with the decision of the 
House of Lords in Johnson. 
 
14.2 Limits to the Doctrine of Contracting Out  
 
Of course there are limits to the doctrine of contracting out. For 
example, the argument in Horkulak that the size of an employee’s 
remuneration and benefits package written into their contract of 
employment justified the disapplication of the duty of trust and 
confidence was not upheld.  
 
For an employer to establish that an employee has waived a breach, 
however, it would appear necessary to show that this was done with 
“actual knowledge” of one’s legal rights. In the Bliss case, Dillon LJ 
imported the following dictum from Peyman v Lanjani132: 
                                                 
131 Supra, n.15 at p. 45  
132 [1985] Ch 457 at p.494  
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 “…[I] do not think that a party to a contract can realistically or 
sensibly be held to have made this irrevocable choice between 
rescission and affirmation unless he has actual knowledge not 
only of the facts of the serious breach of the contract by the other 
party which is the precondition of his right to choose, but also of 
the fact that in the circumstances which exist he does have that 
right to make that choice which the law gives him”.  
 
 14.3 Conclusion
 
There could be considerable repercussions in employment law if this 
line of reasoning was to be followed and as stated by Dillon LJ in Bliss, 
it is a formidable argument. Obviously, it would be more difficult for an 
employer to establish that an employee had waived a breach if it had to 
be shown that this was done with ‘actual knowledge’ of his legal rights.   
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Chapter 15 
 
An Emerging Overarching Principle?  
 
15.1 Introduction
  
There exists a view that the implied term of trust and confidence may 
evolve to engulf the more ‘traditional’ implied terms, such as the 
implied duty to take reasonable care for the employee’s welfare, health 
and safety. Professor Freedland in The Personal Employment 
Contract133 stated that: 
 
“almost any particular implied term of the contract of 
employment could in theory be placed under…[the] umbrella [of 
the general obligation of mutual trust and confidence]; it remains 
to be seen how far this framework approach will lead to the 
swallowing up of existing, hitherto distinct, implied terms.”134  
 
Similarly, Brodie has argued that if any rationalisation of the normative 
content of each of the implied terms of the contract of employment is to 
be made, such an exercise may be conducted by grouping them under an 
all-embracing principle of mutual trust and confidence.  
 
He opines that as the number of reported cases on mutual trust and 
confidence steadily increases it may not be fanciful to suggest that the 
obligation will come to be seen as the core common law duty which 
dictates how employees should be treated during the course of the 
employment relationship. In this regard the embryonic nature of the 
                                                 
133 Supra, n.21  
134 Supra, n.21 at p.159 
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obligation is important because the courts and tribunals can expand its 
scope relatively unrestricted by precedent. The open-textured nature of 
the term makes it an ideal conduit through which the courts can channel 
their views as to how the employment relationship should operate. 
 
15.2 Implied Duties are Inherently Distinct 
 
Following detailed analysis of the viability of the emergence of an 
overarching principle by David Cabrelli, Lecturer in Law, University of 
Dundee, a fundamental point was made that all of the implied duties are 
inherently distinct and that, on balance there is no evidence of the 
implied duty of mutual trust and confidence as an umbrella principle. 
The trends in the recent case law have emphasised the distinctiveness of 
the duties to take reasonable care and mutual trust and confidence. He 
demonstrates that both duties are separate, free-standing duties (of equal 
importance) and to rationalise one and/or all of the traditional employer-
orientated duties, as one of the means by which the super-principle of 
trust and confidence is, or may be expressed, is to a large extent 
‘aspirational’135. 136
 
15.3 Conclusion  
 
In considering whether Ireland might allow the general obligation of 
trust and confidence to develop into an umbrella principle, it is 
submitted that existing inconsistencies are slowly being mitigated in this 
area of development and the path through the law which may be 
followed is steadily being made clearer.  
 
                                                 
135 As described by Professor Freedland in The Personal Employment Contract, supra, n. 21 at p.161  
136 Cabrelli, D., 2005. The Implied Duty of Mutual Trust and Confidence: An Emerging Overarching 
Principle? I.L.J. Vol. 34, No.4  
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It is submitted that the current approach of the judiciary in Ireland and in 
the UK in cutting through previously equivocal precedent and declaring 
in forthright terms is more favourable. Permitting the development of 
such an umbrella principle would, if anything, bring the law on this area 
into a vague and capricious realm.  
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Chapter 16  
 
Conclusions  
 
The implied term of trust and confidence is an example of how the common 
law has changed to recognise a person’s employment is usually one of the most 
important things in his or her life as it gives not only a livelihood but an 
occupation, an identity and sense of self-esteem.  
 
The Courts have used principle of trust and confidence imaginatively to try to 
balance the unequal distribution of power in the employment relationship, so 
that the implied duty now “certainly seems to extend beyond a precise 
formulation to a normative approach or framework of standards for employing 
entities and employees elaborated in particular contexts”.137  
 
While the question of whether Addis will be followed in this jurisdiction awaits 
resolution, it is submitted that it is probable that the finding of the House of 
Lords will be followed such that an employee will not be able to recover 
damages for the manner in which a wrongful dismissal took place or for injured 
feelings. 
 
The position at common law, therefore, continues to be that an employer is 
entitled to dismiss an employee for any reason or no reason, on giving 
reasonable notice, and that damages for the manner of a dismissal are confined 
to those damages to which an employee would be entitled for the notice period 
and do not include damages for the manner of dismissal.  
 
 
 
                                                 
137 Supra, n. 48   
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The Supreme Court decision in Berber displays that evidence of an employee’s 
loss of trust and confidence in his/her employer will now necessarily require a 
high standard of proof. It is considered that the judicial climate is in favour of 
avoiding the potential for the duty to set too high a standard for those who are 
dealing with employees who are claiming to be stressed as a result of an 
employment dispute.  
 
It is contended that the application of a purely objective test is one of the 
methods used to achieving this aim and that this is too narrow an approach to 
what is an area of employment law which necessarily involves emotive 
relationships. Further, it is submitted that such a contention contradicts the 
requirement to consider the parties’ conduct as a whole and the impact of 
behaviour of a cumulative basis.  
 
The considerable potential which remains in this area can clearly be seen in the 
emerging law on bonus payments and increased recourse to the implied duty 
will continue to exert considerable influence on the development of this area of 
law, particularly in assessing the propriety of the exercise by an employer of 
discretion in relation to such bonuses.   
 
There is an opportunity for the law relating to workplace bullying to be guided 
by the operation of the implied obligation to maintain an employee’s trust and 
confidence. It is suggested that creating or condoning an organisational culture 
that permits perpetration of bullying in the workplace should be deemed by the 
courts to be operating the business in a dishonest and corrupt manner along the 
lines of that found in Malik and further employers who act in an intimidatory or 
insulting behaviour (i.e. bullying) should be seen to be acting in breach of this 
term.  
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The potentially far-reaching detrimental consequences of a finding that an 
employee has waived a breach of the implied duty should be balanced with a 
requirement that an employer must establish that an employee had waived a 
breach while having ‘actual knowledge’ of his legal rights.   
 
As regards whether Ireland should allow the general obligation of trust and 
confidence to develop into an umbrella principle, it is suggested that it would 
be preferable in the interests of clarity that existing inconsistencies should 
continue to be mitigated and previously equivocal precedent should be dealt 
with such that it will be possible to declare what the law relating to the implied 
duty is in forthright terms and in terms of the route to achieving such an 
objective, the development of the duty into an overarching principle would a  
step in the wrong direction.   
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